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INTRODUCTION: TOO GOOD TO BE “GOOD FAITH”
The unmasking of a Ponzi scheme usually means that the scam has
run its course and the jig is up. A receiver boards the windows and
changes the locks, broke investors sue, lucky investors get sued, and
the bad guys go to jail. 1 Indeed, in the two years since the Madoff
scandal broke, there is no shortage of candidates for the Ponzi flavor
of the month, but the fifteen minutes of fame fade as fast as the
fictitious profits. 2 As bankruptcy courts encounter more fraudulent
investment schemes, avoidance actions brought by the trustee have
become more common. Accordingly, victims and claimholders
remain in limbo while courts attempt to preserve and allocate
whatever may remain.
The first decade of the twenty-first century exemplifies the
macroeconomic boom-bust-boom cycle. By 2007 and 2008, the
economy dropped to historic lows last seen during the Great

1 See generally Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and
Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157 (1998) (providing a general overview of Ponzi
schemes).
2 See Diana B. Henriques, Proposed Tax Breaks for Ponzi Victims, N.Y. TIMES BUCKS
BLOG (March 25, 2010, 7:19 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/proposed-newtax-breaks-for-ponzi-victims/ (stating that Ponzi losses have become so common that a tax
break for victims may be necessary).
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Depression. 3 In the drama that unfolded as the “Great Recession,”
banks, Wall Street executives, government officials, investors, and
home buyers were all eventually cast as both villain and victim. 4 In
the ensuing mess of finger-pointing, bailouts, and cries for reform, the
arch-villain emerged: Bernie Madoff. He bilked thousands of
investors out of billions of dollars. Madoff certainly was not the only
Ponzi architect, though he was perhaps the biggest. Since Madoff’s
scheme collapsed, authorities have uncovered Ponzi schemes of all
shapes and sizes 5 Unfortunately, for those who fell under the Ponzi
spell, their ability to seek restitution is both incomplete and
inconsistent.
Once Ponzi schemes are exposed, the tattered remains often run to
bankruptcy court, where the court appoints a trustee to reassemble the
pieces and maximize any remaining assets for the benefit of creditors,
including investors.6 Since few assets usually remain, the trustee steps
in as the repo-man to bring property back into the bankruptcy estate—
either through a preferential transfer action or a fraudulent transfer
action. In this article, I focus on the latter as applied to Ponzi
investments. In particular, I examine the good faith defense to
fraudulent transfer actions.
The term “Ponzi scheme” is synonymous with fraud. Ponzi
transactions are simple in the execution: the fraudsters retain the
investors’ capital in exchange for empty promises of high returns. 7
Once the investor seeks to withdraw her returns (as opposed to
principal), it triggers fraudulent transfer liability under section 548 of
the Bankruptcy Code, because the investor receives fictitious profits.
On the other hand, repayment of principal arguably calls in an actual
pre-existing debt, yet it too can give rise to fraudulent transfer
liability. 8 Section 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code does, however,
provide a “good faith” defense to an investor to the extent value was

3 See Enrique Martínez-García & Janet Koech, A Historical Look at the Labor Market
During Recessions, FED. RES. BANK OF DALL. ECON. LETTER, Jan. 2010, at 1, 2 (comparing the
Great Recession to other economic downturns, including the Great Depression).
4 See Mark Landler & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, As Fingers Point in the Financial Crisis,
Many of Them Are Aimed at Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at A15 (detailing all the parties
that people blamed as the market collapsed).
5 Leslie Wayne, The Mini-Madoffs: Troubled Times Are Bringing More Ponzi Inquiries
to Light, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at B1.
6 McDermott, supra note 1, at 158.
7 See id. (discussing the anatomy of a Ponzi scheme).
8 Note, however, that in some cases preferential transfer and fraudulent conveyance laws
have been used interchangeably to recover both principal and profits in Ponzi schemes.
RICHARD I. AARON, Preferential Transfers: The Hard Preferences to Insiders, in 1
BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 10:11 (West 2010).

11/8/2011 5:27:17 PM

22

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

given. In this article, I argue that such defenses should not be
available in federal Ponzi cases.
In addition to the fraudulent transfer action, the bankruptcy trustee
can assert preferential transfer actions, which are typically easier to
prove than fraudulent transfer actions. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code
allows the trustee to recover the full amount of all investor
withdrawals—whether of principal or profit—made within ninety
days prior to the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 9
Referred to as “preferences,” these payments carry a legal
presumption that they have “preferred” the interests of the
withdrawing creditor over the interests of other creditors at a time
when bankruptcy was all but a foregone conclusion. This policy
attempts to level the playing field among creditors. Moreover, the
statute itself (11 U.S.C. § 547(b)) provides an easy-to-follow roadmap
in proving that a preferential transfer occurred. 10
But the ninety-day window limits the reach of preference actions,
and, there may be no transactions within the window to avoid,
depending upon the delay between the discovery and shutdown of the
scheme and the corresponding bankruptcy filing. 11 While the
Bankruptcy Code extends the ninety-day window to one year in cases
of insider withdrawals, most investors who unwittingly contributed to
the scheme are subject to the ninety-day rule.12 Those investors must
return the funds withdrawn, and will then receive an unsecured claim
against the bankruptcy estate in the amount of their principal. 13 Most
9 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006) (outlining the legal requisites for showing the occurrence
of a preferential transfer).
10 Id.
11 The withdrawals of funds—be it principal or interest—generally occur in the months
leading up to the collapse of the scheme. As the federal officials (the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Department of Justice, etc.) move in to lock up shop, the bankruptcy filing
may not occur for weeks or months. If it is the latter, then withdrawals in the ninety days prior
to the bankruptcy from which the trustee can lodge preference actions may not exist.
Consequently, the trustee must look to other sections of the Bankruptcy Code, namely the
section on fraudulent transfers, to effectuate any recovery. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (allowing the
trustee to avoid certain unperfected liens); 11 U.S.C. § 548 (allowing the trustee to avoid
preferential transfers).
12 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (providing the time limits for the trustee’s power to avoid
preferential transfers). In the case of insiders, family members and close friends of the fraudster
are typically the individuals, and sometimes companies, that receive exorbitant profits in Ponzi
schemes. The Madoff case typified this notion given the amount of avoidance actions brought
by the trustee against Madoff family members. See, e.g., Bob Van Voris, Madoff Firm Trustee
Seeks $50 Billion as Clawback Window Closes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 13, 2010,
12:02 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-12-13/madoff-firm-trustee-seeks-50billion-as-clawback-window-closes.html (discussing the massive payments Bernie Madoff made
to family and friends).
13 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (providing that a creditor must have received more than the
creditor otherwise would have as an unsecured creditor for a transfer to be considered a
preference).
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courts will not include any alleged profit in the claim amount since
the profit was the product of an illegal scheme. 14
Investors can assert statutory defenses to protect their withdrawals
from preference actions provided for under section 547(c). One of the
most common of these defenses is the “ordinary course of business”
defense. 15 The Bankruptcy Code provides that a trustee may not avoid
an otherwise preferential transfer if the transaction related to the
ordinary course of the debtor’s business. 16 Courts, however, have
been reluctant, if not hostile, to find that a debtor made a transfer in
the ordinary course of business when the “business” is a Ponzi
scheme. 17 After all, a Ponzi scheme by its nature is neither ordinary
nor legal. 18
Other defenses to a fraudulent transfer action, however, do achieve
some success in a Ponzi scheme. Section 548(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code and similar provisions of equivalent state laws provide a
defense for a transferee who has received the transfer “in good faith”
and “for value.” 19 For purposes of fraudulent transfer actions, “value”
includes “satisfaction . . . of a present or antecedent debt.” 20
Fraudulent transfers in Ponzi schemes operate under the general rule
14 See, e.g., Sender v. Hannahs (In re Hedged Inv. Assocs., Inc.), 176 B.R. 214, 216 (D.
Colo. 1994) (rejecting the trustee’s assertion that a debtor partnership was entitled to the
promise of “guaranteed earnings” where the earnings were the product of a Ponzi scheme).
15 See 11 U.S.C. 547(c)(2) (providing the requirements for establishing an ordinary course
of business defense to the preference action).
16 Id.
17 The ordinary course of business defense has been a work-in-progress for decades.
Previously, its application and success in courts was inconsistent and unpredictable. In an
attempt to fix an ongoing issue with the interpretation of “ordinary course of business,” the 2005
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code included a slight revision of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2). See
Woods v. Stratos Prod. Dev., LLC (In re Ahaza Sys., Inc.), 482 F.3d 1118, 1123–24 n.4 (9th
Cir. 2007) (discussing this relaxation). The amendments relaxed the test for “ordinary course”
such that a creditor must first prove that the suspect debt itself was incurred in the “ordinary
course of business or financial affairs” of that particular debtor and creditor. Id. The creditor
must then also demonstrate that the transfer itself was made either in the ordinary course of
business between the debtor and creditor—a subjective test—or according to ordinary business
terms—an objective test. Id. Prior to 2005, a creditor had to satisfy both the subjective and
objective tests. Id.
18 Indeed, despite stalwart arguments that Ponzi investments are merely a common
practice embedded in an uncommon enterprise, courts reject such contentions. There are,
however, a very small minority of cases that at least provide a slit of light at the end of the
tunnel. See, e.g., Am. Cont’l Corp. v. All Preference Defendants (In re Am. Cont’l Corp.), 142
B.R. 894, 900 (D. Ariz. 1992) (holding that payments to bondholders of principal and interest
were considered part of the ordinary course of business exception to trustee’s avoidance powers,
despite securities fraud indictments against debtor’s senior management); Merrill v. Abbott (In
re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 888 (D. Utah 1987) (denying Ponzi investors’
motion to set aside default judgment and dismissed the investors’ claims against the trustee).
19 11 U.S.C. § 548(c); see also Bear Stearns Secs. Corp. v. Gredd (In re Manhattan Inv.
Fund Ltd.), 397 B.R. 1, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing the good-faith defense and remanding to
the bankruptcy court for a trail on the factual issues).
20 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A).
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that a defrauded investor receives “value” up to the principal amount
of the investment but not “in excess of principal” (i.e., interest). 21 The
justification is that the investor technically has a fraud claim against
the debtor for the false promise of profits based on the actual
investment of principal, but the same is not true for an investor’s
“fictitious, nonexistent ‘profits.’” 22 Consequently, if the debtor
transfers all or a portion of the principal back to the investor, then that
transaction satisfies the fraud claim (an antecedent debt) and achieves
section 548(c)’s “for value” requirement. 23 As a corollary, an
investor’s fraud claim cannot encompass payments that outstrip the
principal because the manufactured profits are not a genuine “value”
that the investor can realize. 24
Lucky investors who pulled out early—and are therefore able to
retain their principal—benefit at the expense of later investors, who
face a possibly empty bankrupt estate from which to recover their
principal. This lopsided situation contradicts bankruptcy policy,
which aims to treat similarly-situated creditors equally. 25 In this
article, I test the utility and reach of section 548(c)’s good faith
defense in the confines of a Ponzi scheme and argue that it should be
unavailable as a defense in Ponzi cases before federal bankruptcy
courts. 26 Limiting the application of the good faith defense in these
circumstances would allow trustees to recover all of the debtor’s
payments to investors—whether principal or interest—and distribute
the funds equally among all defrauded investors.
I. THE PONZI KINGDOM: STITCHING THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES
Ponzi schemes are a unique bankruptcy beast. Creditors become
crime victims instead of debt collectors. The average bankruptcy case
winds its way through proceedings designed to balance various
21 In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, No. A06–62966–PWB, 2009 WL 6506657, at *7
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009).
22 Id.
23 Id. (citing Jobin v. McKay (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 84 F.3d 1330, 1340–41 (10th
Cir. 1996); Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589, 596 (9th
Cir. 1991); Eby v. Ashley, 1 F.2d 971, 973 (4th Cir.1924)).
24 Id. (citing Sender v. Buchanan (In re Hedged-Inv. Assocs., Inc.), 84 F.3d 1286, 1290
(10th Cir. 1996); Wyle, 944 F.2d at 595 n.6)).
25 See, e.g., Gregory v. Cmty. Credit Co. (In re Biggers), 249 B.R. 873, 879 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 2000) (stating this general policy of the Bankruptcy Code).
26 As more fully discussed above, a critical component of my thesis—removing section
548(c) as a defense to a fraudulent transfer action in Ponzi schemes—is that its sole application
is in federal bankruptcy cases and limited to the two-year window provided for by 11 U.S.C. §
548(b). The purpose here is to avoid preemption issues that could arise under comparable state
fraudulent transfer laws. Although a downstream application of this thesis is not foreclosed,
those questions go beyond the scope of this article.
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interests. 27 The Bankruptcy Code itself maintains two distinct goals:
to provide a “fresh start” for the debtor, 28 whereby the bankrupt party
is kept under the protection of the bankruptcy court as it unburdens
some of its debt load, 29 and to treat creditors fairly. 30 While not all
creditors are treated equally (either in or out of bankruptcy), the
Bankruptcy Code endeavors to level the playing field. For the most
part, the Bankruptcy Code is uncompromising about these two basic
principles. 31 In Ponzi schemes, however, that foundation is somewhat
fractured.
A. Ponzi Construction Codes
Ponzi schemes arise out of fraud. The deceit required to maintain
them results in a complex maze of people, funds, and transactions,
and a culprit sprinting to stay ahead of the pack. In short, a perpetrator
lures victims to put money into some sort of investment device
(stocks, property, commodities) with the promise of an “extraordinary
return on the investment.” 32 But the enterprise lacks any legitimacy. 33
Rather, the culprit operates a vicious cycle using funds obtained from
the newest investors to pay “profits” to earlier ones.34 The perpetrator
may even return principal to those who request it.35 Maintaining the
fraud requires a revolving door: that those pleased with their
investment gains simply will reinvest their monies directly back into
the scheme. 36
At some point, the scheme starts to run on fumes—it lacks enough
new investors to pay out the old investors, and checks either begin to

27 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2006) (establishing the priority structure by which claims are
paid); 11 U.S.C. §727 (providing the exceptions to a court granting discharge).
28 See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (discussing “[o]ne of the
primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act”).
29 This is less of a concern in cases where a corporation or other business files for Chapter
7 bankruptcy and liquidates its assets. Presumably, the end of the bankruptcy process means the
end of the business, thereby obviating the need for the “fresh start.” See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)
(providing that the debtor must be an individual to receive a Chapter 7 discharge); see also In re
Boca Village Ass’n, Inc., 422 B.R. 318, 324 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) (discussing this obviation).
30 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727(d) (allowing creditors to move the court to revoke a debtor’s
discharge if the debtor behaved fraudulently); 11 U.S.C. § 507 (establishing the priority scheme
by which creditors are paid); see also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991)
(discussing fair treatment of creditors).
31 See id. (discussing the balance that Congress must strike between conflicting interests).
32 In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, No. A06–62966–PWB, 2009 WL 6506657, at *5
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1924) (describing the original Ponzi
scheme produced by Charles Ponzi himself).
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bounce or just stop coming altogether. 37 The collapse creates victims
of varying sorts. Some investors may get out ahead and receive both
their principal investment and at least a portion of their fictitious
profits. 38 Other investors may recoup only their principal or some
returns but no principal.39 The unluckiest—the last to buy into the
scheme—usually go hungry, getting nothing as they scrabble at the
bottom of the barrel. Those who have not recovered the entirety of
their principal confront the possibility of receiving “little or nothing
from the assets that remain” because their money has either gone to
pay earlier investors, conveniently disappeared, or funded extravagant
luxuries. 40 Generally, when the dust settles the perpetrator’s
company, or, in some cases, companies, finds its way into bankruptcy
court. 41
B. Historic Ponzi Schemes
The history of any pioneer nation is rife with bubbles, speculation,
fraud, deceit, and discovery. From land speculation before the
Revolutionary War to modern day boiler room pump-and-dump
tactics, swindlers have always bilked suckers for profit. 42 Ponzi
schemes share the two most important elements of all large-scale
frauds: the thrill of “inside” information and the assurance of a can’tlose proposition.
Perhaps the first large-scale architect of the scheme was a man
named William Miller. 43 “520 percent Miller,” as he was known,
offered investors startling returns, including a ten percent weekly
dividend. 44 Miller, a bookkeeper for a tea company, recruited heavily
from his church and Bible study class, claiming inside information on
the stock market. 45 Miller took his cue from contemporary “bucket
shops,” shady trading houses that put investors’ money in a “bucket”
without actually buying any stock. When the stock that the investors
Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., 2009 WL 6506657, at *5.
Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. For example, in the Scott Rothstein case, the fraud amounted to an estimated $400
million. Damien Cave, Fraud Accusations Against Florida Lawyer Set Off a Race to Return His
Donations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009 at A14. Even after his arrest and his law firm’s
bankruptcy filing, newspaper reports noted that “[b]ehind a gate at his waterfront mansion . . . a
Cadillac, a Lexus and a white Bentley could [be] seen in the driveway. A security guard said no
one was home.” Id.
41 Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., 2009 WL 6506657, at * 5.
42 See generally DAVID W. MAURER, THE BIG CON: THE STORY OF THE CONFIDENCE
MAN (Anchor Books 1999) (providing a survey of various swindling techniques).
43 Mary Darby, In Ponzi We Trust, SMITHSONIAN, Dec. 1998, at 134, 136.
44 Miller Confesses Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1903, at 16.
45 Id.
37
38
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thought they already owned went down in value, the trader would
purchase it and pocket the difference, thus amounting to an early,
criminal version of short selling.
Miller went one step further by actually paying investors with the
deposits of later backers. 46 By the end of the year, Miller’s scheme
had produced over $480,000 before savvier hucksters duped Miller
himself. Shortly after his financial ruin, he turned jailhouse
informant. 47 While doing time in Sing-Sing prison, he managed to
earn the nickname of “Honest Bill” and a pardon from the governor
before finding himself working as a bookkeeper for the very same tea
company. 48
Charles Ponzi, by contrast, actually did have the germ of a great
business idea when he began his venture in Boston in the early 1900s.
He discovered an arcane investment loophole in the form of a stamp
known as an “International Reply Coupon.” 49 These coupons, first
created in 1906 to reduce the uncertainty and expense of sending
reply envelopes internationally, were calibrated to currency rates
before the First World War. 50 While post-war currencies were
significantly devalued, coupon prices stayed the same, and so while
the Italian Lira maintained only 25 percent of its pre-war value
against the dollar, it still bought exactly the same amount of stamps. 51
At the time, people commonly purchased an international reply
coupon when sending an international letter. 52 The reply coupons
were essentially a voucher that allowed the letter’s recipient to
redeem a postage stamp to send a reply. An investor could simply
convert US dollars to Italian Lira at a ratio of 1:20, and use that
money to buy up coupons. Then, he could return the stamps to the US
and exchange them at face value for a profit.53 There was nothing
problematic about this scheme, exploiting market disparities is known
today as arbitrage, and it is a useful tool in currency exchange. 54
Regardless of the theoretical brilliance of Ponzi’s scheme, it
remained a practical impossibility. The overhead costs of taking part
in all these complicated transactions would be sure to weigh down his
profits, and would require a network of dedicated agents that simply
Id.
520 Per Cent. Miller Exposed in Court: Brother-in-Law Turns on Swindler Who Lived
under an Alias Since Quitting Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1914, at C6.
48 Darby, supra note 43, at 136.
49 MITCHELL ZUCKOFF, PONZI'S SCHEME 94–5 (2005).
50 Id. at 94.
51 Id. at 95.
52 Id. at 94.
53 Id. at 95.
54 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2009) (defining arbitrage).
46
47
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did not exist. 55 Still, he mass-marketed his stamp scheme extremely
successfully, promising 50 percent returns in forty-five days, or 100
percent in ninety. 56 When the Post Office changed their rates on
supply coupons to thwart him, he still managed to win angry crowds
over with sandwiches and coffee while they waited to redeem their
investments. 57 Rather than admit the mistake, Ponzi continued to pay
earlier investors with new investors’ money. He managed to still
attract new investors by relying on the reputation spread by earlier
investors who had enjoyed higher-than-normal returns. 58
Only months after his peace offering of coffee and sandwiches,
Ponzi’s scheme crashed and burned in a spectacular failure. And
when one of Ponzi’s employees declared his boss hopelessly
insolvent, the original Ponzi scheme earned its name. 59 Ponzi’s
resulting bankruptcy case eventually found its way to the United
States Supreme Court. 60 As is true in many Ponzi schemes, a few
early investors smelled the hint of fraud in the air and withdrew funds
in the months leading up to the bankruptcy. Ponzi’s trustees attempted
to recover those withdrawn funds as avoidable preferences. 61 The
investors prevailed at both the trial 62 and appellate levels. 63 Those
courts determined that the redeeming investors could retain their
gains regardless of whether the trustee could trace their funds
separately from those investors who did not make withdrawals.64
The Supreme Court, however, refused to extend that courtesy to
the redeeming investors because it would violate the policy of
equality in bankruptcy. 65 The Court reasoned that the withdrawals
(some of which constituted full refunds) depleted the available funds
before satisfying all the investors.66 The Court held that since fraud
tainted all the funds, to allow some investors to stand behind the
ZUCKOFF, supra note 49, at 96.
Id. at 174–75.
57 Id. at 210. Indeed, investigations showed that there were fewer coupons in circulation
than were necessary to maintain Ponzi’s business.
58 Id. at 211.
59 Id. at 228.
60 Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924).
61 Id. at 4.
62 Lowell v. Brown (In re Ponzi), 280 F. 193, 204 (D. Mass. 1922).
63 Lowell v. Brown, 284 F. 936, 944 (1st Cir. 1922).
64 Id. at 944.
65 Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 9. The Supreme Court’s decision was couched in the ability
to trace funds. According to the Court, a victim had to follow his actual deposits into and out of
the fraudster’s bank account. Id. at 11. Under the Bankruptcy Act, if the victim was unable to
identify his or her particular funds, then he or she was forced to participate as a general creditor
in the bankrupt's estate. See, e.g., In re Kennedy & Cohen, Inc., 612 F.2d 963, 965 (5th Cir.
1980).
66 Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 13. The Supreme Court recognized that the tracing rule could
be avoided if abandoning the rule resulted in equal treatment of the defrauded customers. Id.
55
56
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fiction that Ponzi had withdrawn money legitimately to pay them
“would be carrying the fiction to a fantastic conclusion.” 67 That
fantasy would have allowed some investors to reap full refunds of
their money, while others received nothing. The Court rejected that
result because it would violate the fundamental policy—and what
should be the root of Ponzi law—that “equality is equity, which is the
spirit of the bankrupt[cy] law.” 68
Ponzi schemes sometimes originate from what arguably starts out
as a legitimate investment opportunity. But Bernie Madoff
administered the largest Ponzi scheme in history, without ever
investing a dime. 69 He relied on his reputation for providing relatively
modest, regular returns to his investors to attract newer and bigger
investors. 70 The motto “Bigger, Better, Faster, More” epitomized
Madoff’s investment house. Like other Ponzi scheme operators,
Madoff created a sense of security—the impression that investing
with him amounted to a special invitation into an exclusive club.71
But Madoff never actually invested his clients’ money. True to Ponzi
form, Madoff used new investors’ money to provide the positive and
consistent returns that his early clients enjoyed. At his peak, Madoff’s
clientele included celebrities, wealthy individuals, large investment
houses, and charities that paid him for the privilege of his investment
prowess. 72
Ponzi schemes usually involve “too good to be true” investment
opportunities. While the setup is rote, the execution can be creative.
Ponzi scheme characters seem to go from humdrum (even
respectable) investment gurus to notorious thugs overnight. 73
Former boy-band promoter Lou Pearlman (who unleashed the
likes of the Backstreet Boys and N'Sync on the unsuspecting parents
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
69 Alex Altman, A Brief History of Ponzi Schemes, TIME (Dec. 15, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1866680,00.
70 SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N, Ponzi Schemes—Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm#BernieMadoff, (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
71 See Ronald A. Cass, Madoff Exploited the Jews, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2008, at A19
(noting that Madoff’s power and connections allowed him to carry out his scheme).
72 See Cass, supra note 71 (noting that Madoff’s clientele included Steven Spielberg and
Yeshiva University). Madoff had a powerful résumé. In addition to running his investment
company, Madoff had been a “prominent member of the securities industry throughout his
career.” Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Bernard L. Madoff for MultiBillion Dollar Ponzi Scheme (Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008293.htm. His stints included serving as vice chairman of the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), holding a position on the NASD board of governors, including chairman of its
New York region. Id. In addition, Madoff was on the NASDAQ Stock Market’s board of
governors, its executive committee, and even served as the chairman of the NASDAQ trading
committee. Id.
73 See Altman, supra, note 69 (discussing various Ponzi schemes perpetrators).
67
68
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of tweens and teenagers) pinched $300 million in investor capital
over nearly twenty years. 74 Bronx-born swindler Scott Rothstein
promised his clients that he used great lawyering, investigation and
intimidation to secure large settlements from defendants with sordid
histories. 75 Rothstein effectively blackmailed defendants into
agreeing to large annuity settlements, which he would assign to
investors for a lump sum, and who were promised large returns as the
money rolled in. 76 Or so investors thought. In the end it was not his
New York savvy that brought in the lucre, but the power of his
imagination. The “defendants” were fictitious and the settlements
fanciful. Rothstein’s investments were wholly fraudulent.
Rothstein’s plot disintegrated in less than five years, spawning—as
in most bankruptcy cases—a string of “clawback” proceedings
initiated by the trustee of the firm’s bankruptcy estate to recover
payments received by investors.77 The clawbacks at issue in these
cases evoke the question this paper intends to answer: are those lucky
few investors who cash-out their stake in time liable to the
unfortunate many who do not?
II. THE CLAWBACK CROWD: IN PURSUIT OF PONZI PAYOUTS
Ponzi-scheme creditors are not the average supplier or service
provider seeking payment on an invoice for a delivery made two or
six months before bankruptcy. Rather, the Technicolor cast of
creditors in a Ponzi scheme have varying degrees of interests and
liabilities. Ponzi investors share one thing in common: they are all
victims of an elaborate con. But any collective identity ends there.
Ultimately, the time of their withdrawals separates the winners from
the losers.
A. Ponzi Scheme Definition and Its Players
To properly introduce the cast of characters, it is important to
describe the legal definition of a Ponzi scheme, as opposed to the
media depiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit defines a Ponzi scheme as a “fraudulent investment scheme in
which money contributed by later investors is used to pay artificially
high dividends to the original investors, creating an illusion of
Id.
Kevin McCoy, Fla. Attorney Charged in Alleged Ponzi Case, USA TODAY (Dec. 2,
2009), at 2B.
76 Id.
77 In re Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, P.A., No. 09–34791–BKC–RBR, 2010 WL 3743885,
at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2010).
74
75
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profitability, thus attracting new investors.”78 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit provides an arguably broader
description: “any sort of fraudulent arrangement that uses later
acquired funds or products to pay off previous investors.” 79 Other
courts add the criterion that the scheme failed to “conduct[] . . .
legitimate business as represented to investors” 80—a point that will
become important later in this Article.
As this Article has mentioned, Ponzi investors fall into two broad
categories. First, there are the “net losers”: investors’ whose funds are
used to satisfy earlier investors’ redemptions. Net losers either fail to
receive a full return on their principal investment,81 or, in many
instances, see no return of their principal at all. The other broad
category of investors is the “net winners.” Net winners are the
“lucky” investors who receive redemption payments that exceed the
value of their principal investments. 82 Recoupment of fictitious
profits may subject the net winners to disgorgement, and, in some
instances, even disgorgement of principal. 83 Beyond the two broad
categories, there are also “feeder funds,” which include various hedge
funds, brokerage houses, and banks that steered large pools of
investors into the Ponzi scheme. 84 A Ponzi scheme’s use of these
feeder funds enables it to sweep in thousands of smaller investors to
sustain the scam over a longer period of time. 85
While Charles Ponzi’s name became synonymous with investment
schemes, Bernie Madoff achieved a new yardstick. The Madoff case
typifies the struggle between the net winners and net losers. The
78 Ades-Berg Investors v. Breeden (In re The Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.), 439 F.3d 155,
157 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1198 (8th ed. 2004)).
79 Danning v. Bozek (In re Bullion Reserve of N. Am.), 836 F.2d 1214, 1219 n.8 (9th Cir.
1988) (emphasis added).
80 Floyd v. Dunson (In re Ramirez Rodriguez), 209 B.R. 424, 431 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1997).
81 See, e.g., In re Smith, 132 B.R. 73, 74 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (discussing the trustee’s
attempt to recover money for the “net losers”).
82 Id.
83 McDermott, supra note 1, at 169.
84 See Nick S. Dhesi, Note, The Conman and the Sheriff: SEC Jurisdiction and the Role of
Offshore Financial Centers in Modern Securities Fraud, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1366 (2010)
(discussing Madoff’s choice of offshore centers to establish feeder funds).
85 See id. (discussing how offshore feeder funds allow a fraudster to manipulate returns).
Various groups—individual investors, state regulators, federal agencies, bankruptcy trustees—
often target lawsuits and investigations at the feeder funds that invested customers’ cash into
Ponzi schemes. Lawrence J. Zweifach & Sophia N. Khan, Recent Developments in Ponzi
Scheme Litigation, in AUDITOR LIABILITY IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT: HOW TO PROTECT
YOURSELF 99, 101 (2010). The actions carry varying degrees of success against financial firms,
as most cases turn the question of what the investment house either knew or should have known
about the legitimacy of the investment opportunity. See id. at 120–21 (discussing the claims and
defenses asserted against the investment houses).
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Madoff net winners bitterly contested the Bernard L. Madoff
Investment Securities L.L.C. (BLMIS) bankruptcy trustee Irving
Picard’s position that they should return part of their “profits” to
achieve a more equitable distribution to later investors.86 The net
winners argued that they reasonably relied on BLMIS financial
statements that showed that they had a comfortable nest egg on which
to retire. 87 On the other hand, the net losers—whose principal
investments funded payouts to the earlier investors—agreed with
Picard’s view that equity requires looking “solely to deposits and
withdrawals that in reality occurred” (i.e., real principal instead of
fictitious profits) in order to more evenly distribute any recovery
among all investors.88 A Ponzi scheme’s bankruptcy trustee primarily
relies on two vehicles to strike the more equitable balance between
net winners and net losers: fraudulent transfers and preferential
transfers. 89
B. Ponzi Payouts: Fraudulent or Preferential?
A trustee, or a debtor-in-possession, 90 has two crucial statutory
tools that enable him to clawback funds from creditors, (or, investors
86 See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Bernard L.
Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 424 B.R. 122, 136 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing the Trustee’s
position that the transfers of fictitious profits are avoidable and the objective claimants’
defenses), aff’d, 2011 WL 3568936, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2011).
87 See id. at 134–35 (discussing the net winners’ contention that they reasonably relied on
BLMIS financial statements).
88 See id. at 142 (“To the extent possible, principal will rightly be returned to Net Losers
rather than unjustly rewarded to Net Winners under the guise of profits. In this way, the Net
Investment Method brings the greatest number of investors closest to their positions prior to
Madoff's scheme in an effort to make them whole.”).
89 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548 (2006) (Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code
provides for the recovery of preferential transfers and Section 548 provides for the recovery of
fraudulent transfers).
90 In bankruptcy cases, the power to recover property for the estate is vested in either the
trustee or, in Chapter 11 cases, the debtor-in-possession. See generally id. (providing the trustee
the ability to recover property). In Chapter 11 business bankruptcies, the bankrupt company is
referred to the debtor-in-possession as it attempts to reorganize its debts. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1).
Consequently, the debtor-in-possession, as represented by counsel, may initiate an avoidance
action. The debtor-in-possession is not omnipotent, however. If the debtor-in-possession
exhibits “fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross management,” a trustee may be appointed to
replace the debtor-in-possession. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). The trustee then may pursue any
avoidance actions that the debtor-in-possession would have the right to. While most bankruptcy
Ponzi schemes are ultimately Chapter 7 liquidations because there is no legitimate business to
salvage, some do begin in Chapter 11. In those cases, an appointment of a trustee is immediate
and necessary given the nature of business. See Symposium, The Business Bankruptcy Panel—
Ponzi Schemes—Bankruptcy Court v. Federal Court Equity Receivership, 26 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 207, 212 (2010) (explaining that most of the time, the trustee appointment comes almost
immediately after a receiver). Notwithstanding a Chapter 11 filing, some practitioners and
judges believe that Ponzi schemes should never be Chapter 11 cases since there is little to
nothing to reorganize. See, e.g., id. at 214 (questioning the efficacy of having a ponzi scheme in
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in Ponzi schemes, who received disbursements prior to the
bankruptcy. 91 Through the Bankruptcy Code, trustees can challenge
and seek the return of transfers that were either (1) preferences, or (2)
fraudulent transfers. 92 While the main thrust of this Article concerns
the latter, I think it important to plumb the former for policy reasons
that might suggest an overhaul of fraudulent transfer law in Ponzi
schemes.
In Ponzi schemes, the trustee can avoid pre-bankruptcy transfers of
funds, which the trustee can distribute for the benefit of all creditors.
Accordingly, preference claims are often a trustee’s weapon of
choice. 93 A preference action’s burden of proof is an easier hurdle
than in fraudulent transfer actions because the trustee receives the
benefit of a presumption that any funds, whether principal or profit,
withdrawn within ninety days of the bankruptcy filing are an
improper preference. 94 If the trustee satisfies the elements of a
preference action, the burden shifts to the preferred investor to assert
what is perhaps the only available affirmative defense: that the
transaction occurred in the “ordinary course of business.” 95
The major obstacle to the preference action, however, is that most,
if not all, of the transfers in a Ponzi scheme occur outside that ninetyday limit. By contrast, fraudulent transfers allow the trustee to avoid
transfers beyond the ninety days. The trustee has the burden to prove
one of the following two items. First, the trustee could show that the
transferor’s actual or constructive intent was to “hinder, delay, or
defraud” creditors. 96 Second, the trustee could show that the

a chapter 11).
91 Some Ponzi schemes fall first into a receivership and may remain there or transition
into bankruptcy. Appointed receivers can successfully pursue clawbacks of fraudulent transfers
under state law. The drawback, however, is that receivers do not hold the bevy of powers a
bankruptcy trustee does under the Bankruptcy Code. If a statutory or common law receivership
of the enterprise is not in the best interests of the creditors or the estate, the receiver could
initiate bankruptcy proceedings—such as happened in the Madoff and Peters cases. See, e.g.,
Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. (In re Bernard L. Madoff), No. 09–
11893
(BRL),
at
*3,
(Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.
June
9,
2009),
http://www.madoff.com/documents/252_order.pdf (order appointing the SIPA trustee as the
Chapter 7 trustee of the substantively consolidated estate).
92 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548.
93 See, e.g., Daly v. Simeone (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 270 B.R. 325, 329 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 2001) (finding that plaintiff-trustee of bankrupt estate established all elements of a
preferential transfer); see generally Jobin v. Matthews (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 184 B.R.
136, 139 (D. Colo. 1995) (discussing the policies served by allowing preference claims).
94 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
95 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (providing the elements of the ordinary course of business
defense).
96 See, e.g., Bauman v. Bliese (In re McCarn’s Allstate Fin., Inc.), 326 B.R. 843, 848, 852
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding that trustee successfully established debtor’s intent to defraud
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transferor made the transfer while the transferor was financially
distressed and did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the
transfer. 97
1. Defining and Differentiating Fraudulent Transfers
Fraudulent transfer law is rooted in the antiquated Statute of
Elizabeth, first enacted in 1571. 98 As one of the oldest debt collection
devices, it served as the model for the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act, enacted in many states, and section 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 99 The Statute of Elizabeth and its progeny voided any
conveyance or transfer made with the intent “to delay, hinder or
defraud creditors and others of their just and lawful actions.”100 The
time-honored Twyne’s Case in 1601 broadened clawback capabilities
by providing for various “badges of fraud” that could be used as
circumstantial evidence of the debtor’s intent to defraud its
creditors. 101 Consequently, Anglo-American law has long condemned
a debtor’s attempts to hinder or defraud one’s creditors by
transferring assets. 102 But fraudulent transfers are not unique to
Anglo-American law. The ancestors of the Statute of Elizabeth can be
traced to the early Romans. 103
Fraudulent transfer law’s fundamental purpose is to protect
creditors from debtors’ actions that craft “last-minute diminutions in

under Section 548(a)(1)(A)).
97 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii)(II).
98 See, e.g., In re Maxwell Sheraton, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 680, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (noting
that New York adopted the Statute of Elizabeth prior to adopting a statute that modeled the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act), aff’d sub nom. City of New York v. Johnson, 137 F.2d
163 (2d Cir. 1943).
99 See id. at 682 (explaining that the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act “is the
modernized Statute of Elizabeth”); see also Goveart v. Capital Bank (In re Miami Gen. Hosp.,
Inc.), 124 B.R. 383, 391 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) (reasoning that Florida statute that prohibited
fraudulent transfers and conveyances “was basically a restatement of the law on fraudulent
conveyances as declared by the Statute of Elizabeth” until the statute’s recent amendment).
100 Sexton v. Wheaton, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 229, 242 (1823); see also Hovis v. Ducate (In re
Ducate), 355 B.R. 536, 542 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) (restating the same language in South
Carolina’s fraudulent transfers statute).
101 See, e.g., Warner v. Norton, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 448, 456 (1857) (discussing secrecy as
one of the signs or “badges of fraud”); Colandrea v. Colandrea (In re Colandrea), 17 B.R. 568,
580 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982) (discussing Maryland’s application of the badges of fraud as set out
“by the Star Chamber in Twyne’s Case . . . for the purpose of shifting the burden of proof to the
transferee”).
102 Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348, 354 (1932) (declaring fraudulent transfers have “been
condemned in Anglo-American law since the Statute of Elizabeth” in 1571).
103 See Glinka v. Bank of Vt. (In re Kelton Motors, Inc.), 130 B.R. 170, 176 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1991) (“[F]raudulent conveyance laws extend[] over two thousand years to at least early Roman
law.”).
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the pool of assets” 104 in an attempt to place property beyond the reach
of their creditors.105 The asset depletion often amounts to gratuitous
transfers for little or no value on the eve of bankruptcy. The equitable
purpose behind fraudulent transfer law recognizes “that any
significant disparity between the value received and the value
surrendered will significantly harm innocent creditors.” 106
Preference actions signify a later development in creditor
protection. By definition, a preferential transfer is a payment that
permits a creditor to receive a greater percentage of his claim against
the debtor than he would have received if he had participated in the
general distribution of assets with the other creditors. 107 The purpose
of a preference action is two-fold. First, authorizing the trustee to
avoid pre-bankruptcy transfers within a short period before
bankruptcy discourages creditors from sprinting to the courthouse to
“dismember the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy.” 108 Second,
the preference provisions facilitate the essential bankruptcy policy of
leveling the playing field among creditors by providing for more
equitable distributions of the debtor’s assets. 109 Thus, any creditor that
received a greater payment than other similarly situated creditors
must disgorge that payment so that the whole may share equally. 110 In
short, fraudulent transfers diminish assets of the estate without a
corresponding reduction in debt or obligation; preferential transfers
deplete assets of the estate but also reduce an obligation owing to a
creditor.
2. Ponzi Schemes: Fraud in the Making
Fraudulent transfer law has a flexible underpinning: it looks to the
substance as opposed to the form of the transaction. 111 Thus, even
though there may be no conspiratorial aspect to the payment of a
Ponzi investor, at bottom the transaction is considered fraudulent
because the amount of the payment was either imaginary or simply
104 Pioneer Liquidating Corp. v. San Diego Trust & Sav. Bank (In re Consol. Pioneer
Mortg. Entities), 211 B.R. 704, 717 (S.D. Cal. 1997) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 166 F.3d 342
(9th Cir. 1999).
105 Id.
106 Dayton Title Agency, Inc. v. White Family Cos. (In re Dayton Title Agency, Inc.), 292
B.R. 857, 874 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003).
107 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 160 (1991).
108 Id. at 161 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 177–78 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 See, e.g., Cooper v. Centar Inv. Ltd (In re TriGem Am. Corp.), 431 B.R. 855, 862
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010) (reasoning that it was necessary to look at the entire substance of the
transaction in evaluating whether earmarking doctrine applied to fraudulent transfer action).
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robbed from Peter to pay Paul. 112 Regardless of a Ponzi investor’s
status as a victim of the scheme, bankruptcy trustees routinely use
section 548 to recover payments made to the investors and reallocate
those monies recovered to the larger universe of defrauded
investors. 113
There are two theories under which a bankruptcy trustee may
proceed under section 548: actual fraud 114 or constructive fraud. 115
The “actual fraud” theory requires that the trustee prove that the Ponzi
operator (i.e, debtor) made the transfers to the investor “[w]ith actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” the creditors (i.e. the losing
investors). 116 Unlike the garden variety fraudulent transfer action
where proving actual intent can be a time-intensive process, “[t]he
mere existence of a Ponzi scheme is sufficient to establish actual
intent” to defraud. 117 Ponzi scheme operators often admit, sometimes
in a plea agreement, the “actual intent” element.118 In other words, a
Ponzi scheme provides a presumptive element of actual fraud.119
On the other hand, the “constructive fraud” theory is a twopronged approach. First, it requires that the trustee demonstrate that
the transfer to the investor occurred for less than the “reasonably
equivalent value” in exchange for the payout.120 As the “robbing Peter
to pay Paul” principle holds, profits that the debtor disburses via
collections from later investors cannot amount to a “reasonably
equivalent” exchange for the winning investor’s principal
investment. 121 To meet the second prong of “constructive” fraud, the
trustee must demonstrate that one of four additional events occurred:
112 In a Ponzi scheme, “[t]he fraud consists of funneling proceeds received from new
investors to previous investors in the guise of profits from the alleged business venture, thereby
cultivating an illusion that a legitimate profit-making business opportunity exists and inducing
further investment.” Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589,
590 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991).
113 See, e.g., Floyd v. Dunson (In re Ramirez Rodriguez), 209 B.R. 424, 434 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1997) (applying Section 548 to Ponzi investors).
114 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2006) (providing for avoidance of transfer made with
actual intent to defraud).
115 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (providing for avoidance of transfer for less than
equivalent value).
116 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A).
117 Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
118 See, e.g., Floyd, 209 B.R. at 433 (“[T]he criminal conviction of [the defendant] based
on the debtors’ operation of a Ponzi scheme conclusively establishes fraudulent intent. . . .”).
119 See Barclay, 525 F.3d at 704 (explaining that a Ponzi scheme by itself is enough to
establish transfers were made with actual fraudulent intent).
120 Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), 440 B.R. 243, 261 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2010); Stone v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc. (In re Hennings Feed and Crop Care, Inc.),
365 B.R. 868, 874 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007).
121 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (providing for avoidance of transfer for less
than reasonably equivalent value).
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(1) The debtor was insolvent on the date of the payout or was
rendered insolvent because of it;
(2) The debtor was engaged or about to engage in business
for which the assets remaining after the transfer constituted
“unreasonably small capital”;
(3) The debtor intended to incur debts beyond its ability to
pay them at maturity; or
(4) The debtor made the transfer to or for the benefit of an
insider under a separate agreement and not in the ordinary
course of business.122
The insolvency component of constructive fraud123 is somewhat
straightforward; courts regularly hold Ponzi schemes to be insolvent
from inception. 124 The constructive fraud theory may insulate a
portion of, and in some cases all of, the net winner’s principal. For
payouts less than or equal to the amount of the creditor’s principal
investment, courts often conclude that creditor gave reasonably
equivalent value. 125 That does not apply, however, in cases where the
creditor receives distributions in excess of the investment. 126 Unless
the trustee can establish that investor lacked good faith, some courts
have held that the trustee is limited to recovering the profits paid to
the investor under the constructive fraud theory. 127
In practice, the distinction between constructive and actual fraud
seems insignificant. Constructive fraud takes more legwork (i.e.,
discovery) to prove and the result is generally the same in either case:
the innocent investor must return funds.128 The difference, however,
122 11

U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(IV).
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I) (requiring that transferor was insolvent at time of
transfer or became insovlent as a result).
124 See, e.g., Rieser v. Hayslip (In re Canyon Sys. Corp.), 343 B.R. 615, 650 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 2006) (“[G]iven the undisputed evidence that Canyon was operating a Ponzi scheme from
the time it commenced operations, the Court may find as a matter of law that the Debtor
intended to incur debts beyond its ability to repay.”).
125 Fisher v. Sellis (In re Lake States Commodities, Inc.), 253 B.R. 866, 872 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2000) (internal citations omitted) (“[T]o the extent of invested principal, payments from the
debtor are deemed to be made in exchange for reasonably equivalent value. . . . Payments in
excess of amounts invested are considered fictitious profits because they do not represent a
return on legitimate investment activity.”).
126 See, e.g., Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re Bayou
Grp., LLC), 396 B.R. 810, 843 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that each transfer of fictitious
profits was for less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange) aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
439 B.R. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
127 For an example of a court adopting this holding, see Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762,
771 (9th Cir. 2008).
128 See Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480, 483 n.3 (Bankr.
123 See
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is that a constructive fraud case may insulate some, or all, of a
victim’s principal investment. But the actual fraud theory may be
used to recover the entire amount paid to the investor. Recovery of
principal under the actual fraud theory is, however, subject to a “good
faith defense” that allows an innocent investor to keep funds up to the
amount of the initial investment. 129 Where a transfer is avoided as a
constructive fraud, the trustee’s recovery is limited to the investor’s
profits he or she received over and above the principal investment.130
Notwithstanding, if the trustee proves that the innocent investor was
less than innocent (i.e., lacked good faith), the trustee may use
constructive fraud to recover the investor’s principal.131 Interestingly,
the law of preferences contains no corresponding good faith caveat. 132
3. The Displeasure of Preferences: Timing is Everything
In business situations, many creditors will experience bankruptcy
through the preference lens.133 In Central Virginia Community
College v. Katz, 134 the United States Supreme Court recognized that a
core tenant of the Bankruptcy Code is a debtor’s privilege to avoid
fraudulent and preferential transfers.135
A preference is a payment made on the “eve” of bankruptcy to a
creditor in order to extinguish a pre-existing debt. 136 The term derives
from the legal presumption that by paying a specific creditor the
debtor has preferred that creditor to the detriment of the larger pool of

D. Conn. 2002) (discussing the two theories under which a trustee can pursue fraudulent
transfers).
129 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2006); see also Kapila v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re Pearlman), 440
B.R. 900, 905–06 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010) (stating an affirmative “good faith” defense is
available to individuals in actual fraud cases); Cuthill v. Greenmark, LLC (In re World Vision
Entm’t, Inc.), 275 B.R. 641, 648 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (“All recipients of avoidable transfers
from a debtor operating a Ponzi scheme are entitled to raise good faith as a defense”).
130 See Daly, 286 B.R. at 483 (discussing the Trustee’s attempt to recover interest
payments under a constructive fraud theory).
131 See, e.g., Donell, 533 F.3d at 771 (“Under the constructive fraud theory, the receiver
may only recover ‘profits’ above the initial outlay, unless the receiver can prove a lack of good
faith, in which case the receiver may also recover the amounts that could be considered return of
principal”).
132 See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (allowing recovery of any transfer that provided the transferee with
more than he would have recovered otherwise).
133 Some companies may also face fraudulent transfer actions, but the average trade
creditor for a bankrupt company usually finds itself on the defending end of a preference action.
See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 371–72 (2006) (describing such a dynamic).
134 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
135 Id. at 371–72.
136 Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 443 (1917) (“Preference implies paying or securing a preexisting debt of the person preferred” on the eve of bankruptcy); DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d
1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 1969) (describing a preference as one that is made within four months of
bankruptcy).
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creditors. 137 A trustee must demonstrate that the payment qualifies as
a preference under the criteria set out in section 547(b). Preferences
are voidable transactions, meaning that the trustee can decide whether
to bring an avoidance action and that the creditor has a statutory
opportunity to defeat such an action.138
Preference law’s approach to Ponzi schemes stands in sharp
contrast to fraudulent transfer actions.139 Preference defenses,
including ordinary course of business, serve a simple purpose:
cushioning creditors. The defenses encourage creditors to continue
doing ongoing and regular business with the debtor when bankruptcy
is a foregone conclusion. And preference defenses facilitate ongoing
business relationships that will allow a debtor to operate its business
during the days before and possibly after a bankruptcy. 140 But
preference defenses lose their utility in the Ponzi scheme context
because the very act of paying investors facilitates the fraud rather
than legitimate business. 141
Section 547 does not grant a good faith defense to the transferee,
and the section 550 good faith defense is not given to the initial
transferee of a preferential transfer. 142 In Ponzi scheme proceedings to
recover preferences, perhaps the only viable defense is that the
withdrawal occurred within section 547(c)’s “ordinary course of
business.” This defense houses dual purposes. First, it permits, and
even urges, creditors to engage in normal and customary business
dealings with debtors on the brink of bankruptcy. Second, it
discourages and rejects extraordinary debt collection actions or
payment terms. 143
137 Mosier v. Ever-Fresh Food Co. (In re IRFM, Inc.), 52 F.3d 228, 232 (9th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that one of the underlying policies of a preference action is to prevent “a debtor
from benefitting a particular creditor on the eve of bankruptcy”).
138 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (2006) (enumerating the defenses to a trustee’s preference
action); see also Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 39 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The bankruptcy
trustee has the discretionary power to avoid and to recover preferential transfers.”); Buchwald
Capital Advisors, LLC v. Metl-Span I, Ltd. (In re Pameco Corp.), 356 B.R. 327, 338 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“A creditor against whom a preference suit is sought has the burden of proving
one of the defenses in § 547(c) by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
139 See Jobin v. McKay (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 164 B.R. 657, 662 (D. Co. 1994)
(discussing the good-faith defense to a fraudulent transfer action).
140 See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 157 (1991) (stating that ordinary course of
business defense provides insulation from preference attack against payments part of a bank’s
ordinary course of business).
141 See Sender v. Nancy Elizabeth R. Heggland Family Trust (In re Hedge-Investment
Assocs., Inc.), 48 F.3d 470, 476 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that payments to investor were not to
be considered part of “ordinary course of business” as they were part of an ongoing Ponzi
scheme).
142 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547; 550.
143 See COLLIER ON B ANKRUPTCY: CHAPTER 5 BANKRUPTCY CODE, CREDITORS,
DEBTORS, AND THE ESTATE § 547.04[2][a] (Matthew Bender Co., Inc. ed., 15th ed. rev. 1996)
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But, despite the policy objectives, a creditor must clear several
hurdles to establish the defense. The creditor defendant must show
that debt arose in the ordinary course of business (e.g., an arm’s
length transaction that does not depart from the traditional or historic
dealings between the parties). 144 Moreover, the creditor must establish
that the payments were made in either: (a) the ordinary course of the
parties’ particular business relationship (a subjective test), or (b) the
ordinary course of the business or industry in which the debtor or
creditor operate (an objective test).145
Under this defense, payments made in the ordinary course of
business or financial affairs of the debtor generally escape clawback
under section 547, but may not be applicable in a Ponzi Scheme
case. 146 In theory, section 547(c)(2) of the Code could provide netwinning Ponzi investors with one potent tool to fight a trustee’s
attempt to recover withdrawn funds. Theory and practice, however,
do not always coincide. Indeed, some courts have adopted a blanket
rule that the ordinary course of business defense is simply unavailable
to “any creditor being pursued by a trustee of a Ponzi scheme.” 147
And under section 547, the trustee “may recover both principal
investments as well as fictitious profits earned despite any objective
or subjective good faith defense raised by the investor.” 148 For those
reasons, section 547 preference actions are often superior to
fraudulent transfer actions.

(noting Congress’s intent to discourage unusual action by creditors during a debtor’s slide into
bankruptcy).
144 Id.
145 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2). The industry norm requires an examination of the relevant
industry. The inquiry becomes whether the relevant industry is that of the debtor or creditor if
they have merely a vendor/customer relationship. Since the defense is affirmatively asserted by
the creditor, it would seem that the appropriate industry to consider is that of the creditor.
Nonetheless, a trustee might challenge this and focus the test on the debtor’s industry. Even
assuming that the parties agree, proving the relevant industry practices require expert testimony.
See Finley v. Mr. T’s Apparel (In re Wash. Mfg. Co.), 144 B.R. 376, 380 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1992) (requiring expert testimony); see also Morris v. Kan. Drywall Supply Co. (In re Classic
Drywall, Inc.), 121 B.R. 69, 78–79 (D. Kan. 1990) (finding that testimony of officer of preferred
creditor alone was sufficient).
146 For consumer cases, “the paragraph uses the phrase ‘financial affairs’ to include such
nonbusiness activities as payment of monthly utility bills.” S. REP. No. 95–989, at 88 (1978).
147 McDermott, supra note 1, at 185; see also Henderson v. Buchanan, 985 F.2d. 1021,
1025 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had
previously held Ponzi schemes were not true businesses and thus any transfers related to such
schemes cannot now be deemed within the “ordinary course of business”); In re Taubman, 160
B.R. 964, 991 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (internal citation omitted) (“Ponzi schemes are not
legitimate businesses which Congress intended to protect by enactment of § 547(c)(2).”)
148 Jerry J. Campos, Avoiding the Discretionary Function Rule in the Madoff Case, 55
LOYOLA L.J. 587, 600 (2009) (discussing recourse for defrauded investors of Ponzi schemes
during bankruptcy proceedings).
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Other courts are reluctant to enforce a wholesale ban of the
defense. But the net-winning investor fails regardless because the
courts rule that the “payments made to Ponzi investors cannot satisfy
the requirement that payments must be ‘made according to ordinary
business terms’ because ordinary businesses, among other things, do
not pay fictitious profits.” 149 While preference law has a litany of
defenses available to the transferee, courts rarely, if ever, permit
investors to take advantage of them in Ponzi scheme cases, even
when it comes to return of principal. 150 This tacit policy falls short of
a bright-line rule, but the result is consistent and predictable.
Nonetheless, the facts so fatal to a preference defense—a Ponzi
scheme’s fraudulent purpose and lack of legitimate business
operations—do not have the same effect on defenses to fraudulent
transfer actions, leaving that body of law ripe with ambiguity.
III. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS IN PONZI SCHEMES: THE CHANGING
FACE OF GOOD FAITH
In ordinary businesses, preferences stand apart from fraudulent
transfers. Preferential transfers can be avoided, but the defense
scheme under section 547(c) demonstrates that some transactions will
be protected because they foster regular business activities that may
well keep the pre-bankruptcy doors open for debtor and creditor
alike. 151 Even the name “fraudulent transfers” connotes despicable
conduct. Far from merely favoring a creditor, fraud permeates the
transaction and frustrates legitimate creditor interests.152 In Ponzi
149 McDermott, supra note 1, at 185; see also Jobin v. McKay (In re M&L Bus. Mach.
Co.), 84 F.3d 1330, 1339–40 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a bright-line rule that section 547(c)(2)
should never apply in the context of Ponzi schemes, while holding that the payments were not in
the ordinary course of business resulting from their fraudulence); Inskeep v. Grosso (In re Fin.
Partners, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 629, 637–38 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that Ponzi investors were
not protected by ordinary course of business defense).
150 See, e.g., Grosso, 116 B.R. at 637–38 (holding that Ponzi investors were not protected
by ordinary course of business defense).
151 See, e.g., Redmond v. Ellis Cnty. Abstract & Title Co. (In re Liberty Livestock Co.),
198 B.R. 365, 373 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996) (noting that “[t]he purpose of the ordinary course of
business defense is to encourage creditors to continue to do business with financially strapped
debtors”); Advo-Sys., Inc. v. Maxway Corp., 37 F.3d 1044, 1050 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal
quotations and citation omitted) (stating subsection C grants creditors “considerable latitude in
defining what the relevant industry is” and thus creditors can still find protection under
subsection C even if they substantially deviated from industry norms); see also Terry M.
Anderson, In re Iowa Premium Service Co.: When is a Debt Incurred Under Section 547(c)(2)
of the Bankruptcy Code, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1075, 1093–94 (1984) (presenting notion that
part of the purpose behind section 547(c)(2) is to allow financially-strapped debtors the ability
to continue ongoing business operations in the eve of bankruptcy). But see Sacred Heart Hosp.
v. E.B. O’Reilly Servicing Corp. (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 200 B.R. 114, 116 n.2 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1996) (finding that such public policy is not recognized in 547(c)(2)).
152 The policy behind section 548 “is to prevent a debtor from diminishing, to detriment of
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schemes, however, the distinction between preferences and fraudulent
transfer actions as applied to investors blend into each other. Largely,
the difference depends on timing rather than the nature of the
transaction. And any distinction between the two in Ponzi scheme
cases fails to strictly adhere to comparative norms of section 547 and
548.
If a fraudulent course of business by the debtor can torpedo the
ordinary course of business defense in a Ponzi preference action, then
perhaps the express good faith defense under section 548(c) also has
no place in fraudulent transfer actions related to Ponzi schemes. Some
courts have begun to agree that good faith is a futile gesture.
A. Into the Bayou and Beyond
While 2008 and 2009 proved to be banner years for Ponzi
schemes, one case struck an early tone in fraudulent transfer actions
against investor-defendants. 153 Sam Israel, James Marquez, and
Daniel Marino engineered the Bayou Fund in 1996.154 Virtually from
inception, the fund bled money. 155 In essence, the fund “cooked the
books” by falsifying financial disclosures and doctoring investment
returns. 156 The masquerade intensified when Marino removed the
fund’s independent auditor, and created a fictitious accounting firm to
manage the fraud in-house and assume the role of an independent
auditor.157 From 1999 through 2005, the imaginary accountants
certified the fund’s financial reports despite the absence of any
profit. 158 True to Ponzi form, investor redemptions were funded by
the investment of later-in-time investors. 159 When the scheme
imploded in 2005, the unpaid balances totaled $250 million.160 As
expected, the bankruptcy trustee initiated actions to recover the

some or all creditors, funds that are generally available for distribution to creditors.
Consequently, any funds under control of debtor, regardless of source, are properly deemed the
debtor’s property” and cannot be transferred if such transfer diminishes estate. Nordberg v.
Sanchez (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 813 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1987).
153 Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re Bayou Grp.
LLC), 396 B.R. 810 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 439 B.R. 284
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
154 Id. at 822.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 822–23.
159 Id. at 823–24.
160 Id. at 823.
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money from the redemption payments to investors who successfully
“cashed out” up to one year before the scheme collapsed. 161
Bayou’s facts themselves are not remarkable in the context of
Ponzi schemes. But a series of decisions in the resulting Bayou
bankruptcy has created quite a stir with respect to the good faith
defense. To date, there are four opinions regarding the fraudulent
transfer actions against the redeeming investors. 162 In the first two
cases (Bayou I and Bayou II), the trustee initiated fraudulent transfer
actions against redeeming investors to recover the pre-petition
payments that the fund made to investors within fourteen months of
the bankruptcy filing. 163
Bankruptcy Judge Adlai S. Harding, Jr. handed down Bayou I in
February 2007. 164 The redeeming investors moved to dismiss the
debtor-plaintiffs’ adversary proceeding brought under section
548(a)(1)(A) to avoid the payments based on an actual fraud
theory. 165 In Bayou I, the court denied the motion to dismiss,
concluding that the debtors alleged a prima facie case that the
redemption payments were made with “actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud.” 166 The court’s finding of “actual intent” was premised on
both the “intuitive and inescapable” presumption of fraudulent intent
based on the facts and the broad definition of “Ponzi scheme.” 167 The
court defined the term Ponzi scheme as any “inherently fraudulent
arrangement under which the debtor-transferor must utilize afteracquired investment funds to pay off previous investors in order to
forestall disclosure of the fraud.” 168
The court also held that section 548(a)(1)(A) avoids the entire
amount of “any transfer” where the requisite intent to defraud
exists. 169 Consequently, the redemption payments—in their entirety—
could be avoided since they qualified as “fictitious profits.”170 The
court also noted that section 548(a)(1) does not compel the plaintiff to
161 Id.

at 821.
Christian Bros. High Sch. v. Bayou No Leverage Fund, LLC (In re Bayou Grp.,
LLC), 439 B.R. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (referred to in the text as Bayou IV); Bayou Accredited
Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re Bayou Grp., LLC), 396 B.R. 810 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2008) (referred to in the text as Bayou III), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 439 B.R. 284
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 372 B.R. 661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (referred to in
the text as Bayou II); Bayou Superfund, LLC v. WAM Long/Short Fund II, L.P. (In re Bayou
Grp., LLC), 362 B.R. 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (referred to in the text as Bayou I).
163 In re Bayou Grp., 372 B.R. at 663; Bayou Superfund, 362 B.R. at 626.
164 Bayou Superfund, 362 B.R. at 626.
165 Id. at 633.
166 Id. at 634.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 633.
169 Id. at 634–35.
170 Id. at 634.
162 See
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prove that the investor-defendants lacked good faith because lack of
good faith is not an element of an avoidance claim. 171 Rather, the
burden of pleading good faith rests with the investor as an affirmative
defense. 172
On the heels of Bayou I, Bayou II is considered a slightly different
fraudulent transfer action. In Bayou II, the non-redeeming investors
initiated their own avoidance action to recover the payments made to
the redeeming investors. 173 The court concluded that the nonredeeming investors—despite their status as equity investors—could
nonetheless pursue fraudulent transfer actions due to a contractual
right of redemption. 174
B. The Third Time’s a Charm: Bayou III and the Good Faith Deviant
While Bayou I and Bayou II addressed the more procedural issues
of standing and statutory definitions, Bayou III brought the most
controversial opinion in the case. 175 The debtors filed an adversary
complaint against investors who redeemed their investments within
one year. 176 As before, Bayou sought recovery of the transfers under
section 548(a) and New York Debtor and Creditor Law. 177 The debtor
wanted to claw back both principal and “fictitious profits” that had
been redeemed by the investors. 178 As a threshold matter, the court set
forth the operation of section 548. 179 In particular, the court
emphasized that section 548(a)(1)(A):
(1) applied to avoid the entire amount of “any transfer” made
with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors;
(2) acknowledged that the debtor’s intent could be directed at
either present or future creditors;
(3) required that only the debtor’s intent is relevant;

171 Id.

at 639.

172 Id.
173 In

re Bayou Grp., LLC, 372 B.R. 661, 664 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
at 665, 667.
175 See, e.g., Paul Sinclair, The Sad Tale of Fraudulent Transfers: The Unscrupulous Are
Rewarded and the Diligent Are Punished, AM. BANKR. INST. J. Apr. 2009, at 16 (critiquing
Bayou III’s treatment of the good-faith defense).
176 Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re Bayou Grp.,
LLC), 396 B.R. 810, 821 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 439 B.R. 284
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 825–28.
179 Id. at 825–26.
174 Id.
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(4) did not consider the transferee’s intent, which was only
relevant to the good faith defense; and
(5) attempted to achieve a balance of equities by placing the
transferee in the same position as other similarly situated
creditors. 180
The court then resolved larger issues relevant to, if not critical in,
most Ponzi schemes. Bayou III took up three critical issues. First,
when is a transfer made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud” present or future creditors? 181 Second, what is the role of
good faith as an affirmative defense? 182 And third, what qualifies as
“inquiry notice” and “diligent inquiry” for purposes of the good faith
defense? 183
1. An Easy Hunt for Intent
In Bayou III, the court narrowed its iteration of “actual intent”
from its pronouncement in Bayou I. In Bayou I, the court determined
that actual intent in a Ponzi scheme is present if the facts demonstrate
that the scheme used later-in-time investment to pay earlier investors
and perpetuate the fraud.184 In contrast, Bayou III tapered the focus to
the intent of Bayou management when it knowingly authorized the
redemption payments in excess of the contractual amounts that were
the product of the cooked books. 185 Consequently, the court held that
each redemption payment qualified as an intentional
misrepresentation and deliberate concealment of the real accounts.186
Accordingly, the court found that the payments were made with the
“actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” because the redemptions
constituted fraudulent payments that lacked any reason or purpose
“and damaged the remaining investors.” 187
2. The Boundaries of Good Faith
After the Bayou plaintiffs established that fraudulent transfers
occurred under section 548(a), the burden shifted to the investor-

180 Id.

at 825–27.
at 842–43.
182 Id. at 843–45.
183 Id. at 845–47.
184 Bayou Superfund, LLC v. WAM Long/Short Fund II, L.P. (In re Bayou Grp., LLC),
362 B.R. 624, 633 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
185 Bayou Accredited Fund, 396 B.R. at 843.
186 Id.
187 Id.
181 Id.
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defendants to prove their affirmative defense of good faith under
section 548(c). Section 548(c) states:
[A] transferee or obligee of such a transfer or obligation that
takes for value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain
any interest transferred or may enforce any obligation
incurred, as the case may be, to the extent that such transferee
or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for such
transfer or obligation. 188
Under section 548(c), a transferee may retain a transfer if the
transferee (1) takes for value and (2) takes in good faith. Note that the
defense encompasses the components of “good faith” and “value,”
both of which the defendant must prove. In Bayou III, “value” was
not at issue, but the court spent a considerable analysis on section
548(c)’s “good faith” prong. 189 The court observed that “good faith”
is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code and lacks worthwhile
legislative history. 190 Instead, the court reasoned that it must look to
case law to extract both definition and application of “good faith.”191
According to Bayou III, the “good faith” element of section 548(c)
is an objective inquiry, and a transferee’s subjective good faith is
irrelevant. 192 This objective perspective asks what the transferee
objectively knew or should have known in deciding whether that
transferee accepted a payment in good faith.193 Under the objective
test, good faith does not exist if the surrounding circumstances would
place a reasonable person on inquiry notice of debtor’s fraudulent
objective, and diligent inquiry would have revealed the fraud. 194 To
analyze the defendant’s good faith defense, the Bayou III court used
the Manhattan Fund test, which “requires either that: (1) the
transferee was not on ‘inquiry notice’; or (2) if on notice, the
transferee was ‘diligent in its investigation’ of the transferor.” 195
Moreover, a redeeming investor transferee need not have knowledge
of some underlying fraud to be on inquiry notice.196

188 11

U.S.C. § 548(c) (2006).
Accredited Fund, 396 B.R. at 844.

189 Bayou
190 Id.
191 Id.

192 Id. (citing Bear Stearns Secs. Corp. v. Gredd (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund), 397 B.R. 1,
23 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
193 Id. at 845 (quoting Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners (In re Agric. Research and Tech.
Grp., Inc.), 916 F.2d 528, 535–36 (9th Cir. 1990)).
194 Id.
195 Id. (citing In re Manhattan Inv. Fund, 397 B.R. at 22).
196 Id.
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a. Inquiring Minds Need to Know
Notwithstanding the good faith defense’s objective nature, the
Bayou III court recognized that it cannot exist in a vacuum: “[T]o
disregard objective evidence of the transferee’s subjective good faith
intent would fundamentally distort the concept of good faith.” 197 Still,
an investor in a Ponzi scheme, is presumed to be on inquiry notice if
she “knew or should know of information” or a “red flag” placing her
“objectively ‘on alert that there was a potential problem with the
Fund’ such that the transferee ‘should have attempted to learn
more.’” 198 Thus, as a matter of law, the transferee bears the burden of
establishing that he or she was not on inquiry notice.199
The concept of good faith is an imprecise fixture in section 548.
But the presence of certain factors helps to clear the inherent
ambiguity. Many conditions clearly negate the good faith defense. For
example, when: (1) the transferee knew the fraudulent purpose of the
transfer; (2) there was underlying fraud; (3) the transferor had an
unfavorable financial condition or was insolvent; (4) the nature of the
transfer was improper; or (5) the transfer was voidable. 200 Despite the
societal tendency to label Ponzi scheme investors “victims,” courts
have been reluctant to construe the inquiry notice prong broadly in a
manner that parallels the concept of strict liability in tort law.201
b. C.Y.A. Analysis
Once the inquiry notice prong is satisfied, a transferee’s failure to
conduct a “diligent investigation” sinks the good faith defense. In
other words, an investor on inquiry notice must mitigate and cancel
out his or her problem by performing a thorough investigation.202 The
“diligent investigation” prong of section 548(c) cannot be met simply
by speaking with the Ponzi operator. 203 After all, those individuals
have a tremendous incentive to obscure truth, and, in some cases,
have perfected the art of placating investors.
Taking the ostrich head-in-the-sand approach (i.e., the “what you
don’t know can’t hurt you” mentality) defeats the good faith
197 Id.
198 Id.

at 849.
at 845 (quoting In re Manhattan Inv. Fund, 397 B.R. at 23).

199 Id.
200 Id.

at 845–46.
Jobin v. McKay (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 84 F.3d 1330, 1335–36 (10th Cir.
1996) (internal citation omitted) (holding that the presence of any circumstance placing the
transferee on inquiry as to the financial condition of the transferor may be a contributing factor
in depriving the transferee of the good-faith defense).
202 Bayou Accredited Fund, 369 B.R. at 846.
203 Id.
201 See
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defense. 204 Bayou III further held that an “inconclusive diligent
investigation” which failed to uncover the fraud will not, on its own,
prove good faith. 205 The investor must demonstrate that the reason for
the withdrawal was “not because he had some information that there
was some infirmity in the fund, but because of some other reason
personal to him and extraneous to the well-being of the fund and its
remaining investors.” 206 Consequently, in order to pass the Bayou III
good faith hurdle, a Ponzi investor would need to show the following
two items. First, an investor must establish that she made a diligent
inquiry, the results of which signaled the “all clear.” Second, she has
to show that the withdrawal was the product of some extraneous
purpose, such as buying a house, wholly unrelated to red flags. 207
c. Objectifying Good Faith
To illustrate its view of permissible redemptions, Bayou III listed
specific examples of extraneous circumstances that amounted to good
faith, including:
(1) A pension plan liquidating its Bayou investment (along
with other investments) to comply with ERISA;
(2) A trust withdrawing funds for the sole purpose of funding
a home purchase;
(3) A partnership requesting a redemption as part of a
liquidation of assets in advance of a partner’s death;
(4) A parent withdrawing funds to cover expenses of a
newborn child and private school tuition expenses;
(5) Bayou returning an investment and closing an account
after an investor’s balance fell below the minimum levels
accepted by Bayou; and
(6) A fund seeking a partial satisfaction of its Bayou
investment to fulfill withdrawal requests from its own
investors and to pay a bank loan.208

204 Id.
205 Id.

at 847.
at 851.

206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.

at 850.
at 853.
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The court explained that all of the above redemptions met the
objective good faith defense, which allowed the investors to retain the
redemption payments attributable to the principal investment but
required them to return any fictitious profits. 209
C. Battle over Bayou
Bayou III perhaps went further than other courts in denying the
good faith defense. 210 But Bayou III also provided an arbitrary set of
exceptions, which seem to drift back toward subjective motivations
for withdrawing funds. For example, using withdrawals to fund the
purchase of a home or the birth of a child are laudable, if not
sympathetic, reasons. But the court also permitted a feeder fund to
pay off its own bank loan. The court initially approached strict
liability in Ponzi scheme redemptions, but then whipsawed, carving
out exceptions for a select few withdrawals. While the court’s gesture
was an attempt to soften the hardship of losing money by inserting a
scintilla of fairness, it still resulted in disparate treatment. The
judgment merely realigned the “haves” and the “have-nots.”
Several articles have harshly criticized Bayou III for placing
restrictions on the good faith defense’s applicability in Ponzi
schemes. 211 Notably, the commentators object to what they perceive
as Bayou III’s wholesale rejection of “decades of tradition
interpreting fraudulent transfer law since its inception in the Statute of
Elizabeth.” 212
Bayou III’s critics are more vocal than its defenders. I think,
however, that Bayou III laid the foundation for eliminating the good
faith defense under section 548(c) altogether. Bayou III got much of
the analysis right, but it could have—and should have—gone further.
Critics argue that the Bayou III configuration of the good faith
defense causes investors to lose the defense if they fail to ask the right
questions. But that is perhaps the best result, and one that unifies
209 Id.
210 Although some courts have strayed in that direction. See Smith v. Suarez (In re IFS Fin.
Corp.), 417 B.R. 419, 427 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that defendants were not good-faith
transferees where evidence indicated that they knew or should have known of the illegitimacy of
the subject investments and that board member acted as siblings’ “agent” and thus under agency
law his knowledge of fraud was imputed to the principal); see also Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 16, Wing v. Nathenson, No. 2:09–cv–
109–DB (D. Utah Sept. 4, 2009), 2009 WL 5129177) (arguing that the transferee must
undertake a diligent investigation when put on inquiry notice of suspicious circumstances).
211 For an example of that critique see Sinclair, supra note 178, at 16; see also Kathy L.
Yeatter, Investors Beware: Bankruptcy Court Decision Takes Narrow View of “Good Faith”
Under § 548(C), AM. BANKR. INST. J. Feb. 2009, at 38, 49 (arguing that the facts of Bayou III
supported the good-faith defense).
212 Sinclair, supra note 178, at 16.
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investors instead of creating factions. Indeed, a healthy dose of
Schadenfreude 213 calms the maddening crowd by spreading shared
blame and shared pain among all. Nor should the good faith defense
be limited because of burden on the courts, which would have to
adjudicate the massive amount of claw back actions. The good faith
defense’s elimination is fortified by the fact that it will achieve equity
among all creditors. 214
Bayou III’s influence on the good faith defense would be shortlived. The jilted investors appealed to the district court, and the result
was Bayou IV. 215 While the district court affirmed many of the
bankruptcy court’s holdings, it categorically rejected the holding of
good faith. 216 The district court held that when considering red flags
of fraud in connection with the investor’s related conduct, courts
should evaluate the specific circumstances of each transfer.217
Consequently, Bayou IV formulated the question as whether a
transferee reasonably should have known of the fraudulent intent
underlying the transfer. 218
Bayou IV also concluded that the objective reasonable investor
standard applies to both the inquiry notice and diligent investigation
prongs of the good faith defense. The district court determined that
the bankruptcy court’s analysis of “red flags” that included “some
infirmity in Bayou or the integrity of its management,” was overly
broad and untenable. 219 Rather, it is “information suggesting
insolvency or a fraudulent purpose in making a transfer that triggers
inquiry notice.” 220
Furthermore, Bayou IV rejected that bankruptcy court’s
interpretation of the good faith defense’s diligent investigation
prong. 221 The district court concluded that the good faith defense
could not be forced into a strict box.222 Insisting on such rigidity,
according to the district court, ignores the good faith defense’s
213 Schadenfreude is where pleasure is derived from the misfortune of others. OXFORD
ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/schadenfreude?view=uk
(last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
214 Cf. Pepper v. Litton 308 U.S. 295, 304–05 (1939) (discussing the Bankruptcy Court’s
broad equitable powers).
215 Christian Bros. High Sch. v. Bayou No Leverage Fund, LLC (In re Bayou Grp., LLC),
439 B.R. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
216 Id. at 316–17.
217 Id. at 313.
218 Id. at 311.
219 Id. at 314 (quoting Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In
re Bayou Grp., LLC), 396 B.R. 810, 848 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
439 B.R. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
220 Id.
221 Id. at 315–17.
222 Id. at 317.
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historical objectivity and would force judges to measure the
transferee’s subjective motivations and intentions. 223 As a last nail in
Bayou III’s coffin, the district court ruled that if “the transferee can
meet its burden of demonstrating that a diligent investigation would
not have led to discovery of the fraud, it may prevail on [the diligent
investigation prong],” and defeat the specter of inquiry notice. 224
Despite the district court’s more generous construction of the good
faith defense, the defendant-funds still lost once the issue proceeded
to trial. 225 The jury found that the funds failed to make the required
investigation, and thus ordered the return of the entire amount paid to
the defendant investors.226
Unfortunately, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York continues to upend the good faith defense as
used in Ponzi schemes, including one that expands the defense to its
widest berth yet. In another Madoff spinoff, Picard v. Katz, 227 the
district court staunchly rejected the objective, or inquiry notice,
approach, at least in the context of a Securities Investor Protection
Act (“SIPA”) trusteeship. 228 The court noted that in cases involving
bankrupt securities firms, bankruptcy law incorporates certain
elements of securities law. 229 Consequently, the “safe harbor”
provision of section 546(e) barred the trustee from pursuing any
claims based upon either preference law or constructive fraud. 230 The
trustee was only left with the actual fraud claims under section
548(a)(1)(A), which the court then narrowly construed. 231
The court held where a SIPA trusteeship was involved, the trustee
in bankruptcy had to prove the level of scienter required in a
223 Id.
224 Id. There are other defenses available in fraudulent transfer actions aside from the goodfaith defense embodied in section 548(c), including the in pari delicto doctrine, which is the
common law notion that “a plaintiff may not assert a claim against a defendant if the plaintiff
bears fault for the claim.” Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Bank of Am., N.A., 390 B.R. 64, 78
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal citation omitted). Growing in its success rate, it and any other
defenses outside of good faith are beyond the scope of this article.
225 Joel Rosenblatt, Bayou Group Estate Wins $13 Million from Hedge Funds for Fraud
Investors, BLOOMBERG (May 12, 2011, 9:08 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0513/bayou-group-estate-wins-13-million-from-hedge-funds-for-fraud-investors.html.
226 Id.
227 No. 11 CIV. 3605(JSR), 2011 WL 4448638 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011).
228 Id. at *5. When a brokerage firm fails, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(“SIPC”) (discussed infra Part IV.A) transfers the failed brokerage’s accounts to a different
securities brokerage firm. If the SIPC is unable to arrange the accounts’ transfer, the failed firm
is liquidated. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. (2006) (detailing the procedure by which SIPC
winds up a failed brokerage). In the Madoff case, the liquidation began under SIPA and flowed
into the bankruptcy court.
229 Katz, 2011 WL 4448638, at *2.
230 Id.
231 Id. at *1.
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securities fraud case: “proof of more than negligent nonfeasance.”232
Focusing on the plain language of the statute, the court rejected
Picard’s argument that applying the safe harbor in the instant case ran
counter to the legislative goals.233 In addition to the plain language,
the court also felt the aims of the legislation would be served because
the recovery actions in the Madoff case threatened the sort of market
upheaval SIPA was designed to avoid. 234 Addressing the good faith
defense, the court reasoned that although securities law prohibited an
investor from “willful blindness” to obvious fraud, “[a] securities
investor has no inherent duty to inquire about his stockbroker, and
SIPA creates no such duty.” 235 According to the court’s formulation,
the good faith defense remains available when an investor encounters
“suspicious circumstances” and still fails to undertake any
investigation. 236
Although the result in Katz delighted fans of the New York
Mets, 237 it directly conflicted with another Southern District of New
York opinion in the Madoff case, Picard v. Merkin, 238 decided only a
month earlier. In Merkin, the district court ruled that the complaint—
which alleged fraudulent transfers based on both actual and
constructive fraud—could survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
In contrast to Judge Rakoff, Judge Wood determined that both the
Bankruptcy Code and New York state law focus squarely on the
intent of the debtor-transferor and not the intent of the transferee. 239
The court went on to conclude that the application of the section
546(e) safe harbor defense at this point in the case was premature, as
the court had not yet crossed that bridge.
Given two wildly different interpretations of the good faith defense
within the confines of the same case, the only thing that is clear is the
232 Id.

at *5 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 215 (1976)).
at *2–*3.
234 Id. at *3.
235 Id. at *5.
236 Id. at *6.
237 The avoidance action sought to recover $300 million worth of fictitious profits and
$700 million in principle from the owners of the New York Mets. Jonathan Stempel & Grant
McCool, UPDATE 3-Judge Narrows $1 bln Madoff Case vs NY Mets Owners, REUTERS (Sept.
27, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/27/madoff-mets-dUSS1E78Q1UA20110927.
The team owners motioned to dismiss the lawsuit arguing that they had no knowledge of the
Ponzi scheme. Id. Picard’s suit further endangered the owners’ tenuous hold on the Mets, a team
already facing substantial financial losses. Id. Judge Rakoff’s decision limits Picard’s potential
recovery to the $300 million payout of “profits”. Id.
238 Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC), SIPA
Liquidation Case No. 08–01789 (BRL), Adv. Proc. No. 09–1182 (BRL) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31,
2011).
239 Id. at 8–13. In New York, however, the transferee’s intent (or lack thereof) can be
considered an affirmative defense.
233 Id.
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unpredictability and inconsistency of the application of the good faith
defense. A litigant attempting to ascertain the legal landscape of the
good faith defense in Ponzi schemes would be no worse for the wear
if he or she flipped a coin on read tea leaves at the bottom of a cup.
And the last two Madoff cases examined the “good faith” prong of
section 548(c) without touching upon the “for value” component of
the defense.
D. Calculating “Value” into the Good Faith Equation of Section
548(c)
Last year, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Georgia decided whether equity-denominated investments
that were repaid can be the bases of “value” for purposes of the
section 548(c) defense. In re International Management Associates,
L.L.C. (“IMA”) 240 illustrates the different notions and play of defenses
in fraudulent transfer actions in Ponzi schemes. A seemingly routine
fraudulent transfer case, IMA catapulted to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit by route of the rarely used direct
appeal. 241
The facts are voluminous, but are neither remarkable nor complex.
Kirk Wright formed the International Management Associates L.L.C.
(“IMA”) and a string of related companies 242 to manage and operate
as hedge funds. The corporate structure of each was either a limited
liability company or a limited partnership.243 True to the label
“Ponzi,” Wright pursued investors from whom he collected capital
contributions. Funds from the next tier of investors were used to pay
the earlier investors more than the value of their equity investments,
including nonexistent principal and imaginary profits, to “perpetuate
the illusion” that the IMA hedge funds were producing profits. 244 The
gain margin served two purposes: (1) preventing the existing
investors from seeking a return of their principal equity investments
and (2) inducing prospective and existing investors to make new
equity investments.
Wright’s investors were quickly herded into a bubble, and Wright
himself moved into the big leagues. Among others, he targeted retired
240 No. A06–62966–PWB, 2009 WL 6506657 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2009), aff’d, No. 10–
10683, 2011 WL 5103951 (Oct. 27, 2011).
241 In re Int. Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, 2009 WL 6498191 (order certifying case for direct
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit).
242 All of Wright’s companies entered bankruptcy in 2006; the cases were then
substantively consolidated. In re IMA, 2009 WL 6506657, at *5 n.4.
243 Id. at *8.
244 Id.
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National Football League (“NFL”) players as investors. 245 In fact, the
NFL and its affiliate the NFL Players Association placed Wright on a
list of approved financial advisors for players. 246 Eventually the “too
good to be true” investment vehicle collapsed. The SEC exposed the
charade, and, in early 2006, a federal receiver took control of the
companies. 247 In March 2006, the receiver filed the Chapter 11
bankruptcy for the IMA companies and was appointed the Chapter 11
trustee. 248 Two years later, a federal jury convicted Wright of fraud
and money laundering. 249 Three days after the conviction, he
committed suicide in jail.250 But the case did not end there. A trail of
lawsuits, beleaguered victims, and empty company coffers remained.
With the fraud in excess of $150 million and a large pot to feed,
the bankruptcy trustee sued certain “Investor Defendants” who
received transfers from IMA during the operation of the Ponzi
scheme. 251 The bankruptcy court consolidated the 108 adversary
proceedings. 252 The consolidation effort was for one purpose: to
answer the question of “whether an Investor Defendant, as a holder of
an equity interest (as opposed to a claim based on a debt) in a Debtor,
can establish that the Investor Defendant tendered ‘value’ to the
transferor-Debtor in exchange for the cash transfer that the Investor
Defendant received from the Debtor.” 253
To limit its focus to the pure question of law, the court assumed
that that trustee had established his prima facie avoidance case under
federal and state law fraudulent transfer statutes. 254 For a trustee to
avoid a transfer under section 548(a)(1)(B) as constructively
fraudulent, the trustee must show that the “debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily . . . received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
245 See Atwater v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 1:06–CV–1510–JEC, 2009
WL 3254925, at *2, 189 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2812 (N.D. Ga. March 27, 2009), aff’d, 626 F.3d
1170 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing the former NFL players’ suit against the association for
negligently performing background checks on Wright and other financial advisors).
246 Id. at *1–2
247 In re IMA, 2009 WL 6506657, at *5.
248 Id.
249 DOJ Press Release, http://www.justice.gov/usao/gan/press/2008/05-21-08.pdf
250 See Dorie Turner, Man Convicted of Hedge Fund Fraud Commits Suicide in Jail,
USATODAY.COM
(May
25,
2008,
6:19
PM),
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-05-25-1668624117_x.htm.
251 In re IMA, 2009 WL 6506657, at *5.
252 Id. at *5 n.1.
253 In re Int. Mgmt. Assocs. LLC, No. A06–62966–PWB, 2009 WL 6498191, at *2
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009).
254 The relevant facts included: (a) that the Investor Defendant tendered an essentially
worthless equity interest to the Debtor in exchange for the transfer; and (b) that the Investor
Defendant held an unasserted claim against the Debtor that arose at the time the Investor
Defendant originally invested as an equity holder in the Debtor. In re IMA, 2009 WL 6506657,
at *8–*9.
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exchange for the transfer.” 255 Under Section 548(a)(1)(A) (i.e., actual
fraud), the reasonably equivalent value issue is inapposite because the
transfer is actually fraudulent.256 The transferee, however, is entitled
to keep the transfer if she can prove that she acted in “good faith” and
that she provided the transferor “value” in exchange for the
transfer. 257
By the language of section 548(c), the average fraudulent transfer
defendant can establish an affirmative defense to a trustee’s
avoidance action by showing that it provided “value” in exchange for
any transfer made for the Debtor’s interest. The “value” inquiry exists
independently of the question of “good faith.” 258 In Ponzi schemes,
however, Investor Defendants are not your average ilk. The transfer is
made on account of the Investor Defendant’s equity interest, an
interest that arguably never had any value to begin with.
Consequently, the availability of the section 548(c) defense is in
doubt in Ponzi schemes because any cognizable value disappears to
the inescapable bottom of a black hole. The bankruptcy court in IMA
was right to question whether an exchange for value in equity
interests is even possible in a Ponzi scheme. 259
In IMA, the court adopted the well-established money in/money
out principal that a “defrauded Ponzi scheme investor has a claim for
the return of its principal investment based on fraud and that the
satisfaction of this fraud claim through transfers, at least up to the
amount of principal, constitutes ‘value’ for purposes of the defense to
a fraudulent transfer claim under section 548(c) and equivalent state
laws.” 260 But the trustee sought an exception to the general rule when
the victim’s principal investment is in the form of equity. The trustee
argued that in a Ponzi scheme, a transfer on account of an equity
interest cannot be an exchange for value: the distinction between IMA
and the “run of the mill” Ponzi being the equity nature of the
255 11

U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A).
257 11 U.S.C. § 548(c).
258 See In re IMA, 2009 WL 6506657, at *8 (stating that an adverse ruling on trustee’s
motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a ruling “that, as a matter of law, an investor who
made an equity investment in the debtors and received payments did not receive the payments
‘for value,’” did not “fully negate the Trustee's ability to defeat the [section 548(c)] defense,
because the defense also requires that the transfer be in ‘good faith’”).
259 See id. at *9 (acknowledging the trustee’s argument that the general rule “that the
victim of a Ponzi scheme has a claim for the return of the principal it invested based on fraud
and that payments up to the amount of the invested principal are made in exchange for ‘value’”
does not apply in situations where the “victim's investment takes the form of an equity
investment,” but concluding “that interpretation of the fraudulent transfer laws has made no
distinction based on the form of the investment”).
260 Id. at *10.
256 11
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fraudulent investments that the Debtors offered in their capital
contribution structure. 261
The trustee’s argument has some attractive features, especially its
promotion of the equality of distribution. Ponzi victims would be
placed in a one-size-fits-all box without regard to the strategic
positioning of who got out and when. The bankruptcy court found the
trustee’s foothold persuasive but not authoritative. Ultimately, the
court had to decide between equal application (principal Ponzi
payments constitute value) and equal distribution (Ponzi equity,
participation, and debt receive identical treatment) under the law. 262
The court held that the former rule prevailed, and that the debtors
received “value” to the extent of the invested principal. 263 Despite its
conclusion, the court made an effort to point out that the rule should
be equal distribution regardless of whether the investments took the
form of debt or equity. 264 The court found no authority, however, to
support that proposition. In fact, only one United States Court of
Appeals had ever discussed the question, and the bankruptcy court in
IMA followed its lead. 265
Despite being hamstrung by law and practice, the bankruptcy court
recognized the importance of the issue, and certified the question for
direct appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.266 The bankruptcy court noted
that the glut of Ponzi schemes in the United States merits a closer
look at the question. 267 The court indicated that numerous judges,
trustees, receivers, and parties need guidance and a definitive rule.268
The bankruptcy court expressly pointed out that current case law
leaves only a default rule to apply: that “investors who held equity
interests in the fraudulent scheme from the outset could assert the
‘value’ defense.” 269 In other words, the bankruptcy court thought it
necessary that a court of appeals establish the rules of play for the
equity interests in Ponzi schemes. 270 Whether the equity holders
constitute a special team, the IMA court believed that every investor
should get equal play time and distributions.
261 Id.

at *9
Court concludes that no principled basis exists for a different result depending
on the technical form of the fraudulent investment” Id. at *10.
263 Id.
264 Id. at *9.
265 See Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700, 706–707 (9th Cir.
2008) (discussing “reasonably equivalent value” ).
266 In re Int. Mgmt. Assocs., No. A06–62966–PWB, 2009 WL 6498191, at *1 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009).
267 Id. at *3.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
262 “[T]he
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In IMA, the parties fundamentally disagreed about whether equity
interest should be analyzed differently than debt-based claims. 271 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling. 272 Reiterating
adherence to the substance over form rule, the appeals court held that
an equity interest did constitute value.273 The appeals court also
agreed that purchasing an equity interest from a Ponzi scheme
established a claim for fraud or restitution, the debtor’s subsequent
withdrawals amounted to a release of those claims, and were therefore
“for value.” 274 Not surprisingly, given the specificity of the issue, the
court did not opine upon whether section 548(c) should be
unavailable to the universe of Ponzi scheme investment clawbacks,
irrespective of equity status. Given the expanding universe of Ponzi
schemes and defrauded investors, the “value” component is as much a
recurring issue as good faith.275 Current practice applies fraudulent
transfer law uniformly in an effort to reallocate losses among all
Ponzi victims. As the IMA opinion pointed out, substance governs
over the transaction’s form so that Ponzi victims can retain payment
of and submit claims for funds up to the amount of the principal. 276
Notions of equity and fairness may, counter-intuitively, dictate
disparate treatment for equity investments. But an equally compelling
argument is that investors should not be penalized for the manner in
which a Ponzi fraudster perpetrated the scheme.
Either way, the general rule—that the repayment of principal
constitutes value in exchange for the transfer irrespective of whether
the investment was debt or equity—may be running into overtime.
Judicial discontent from Bayou to IMA has generated some
congressional conversations about rulemaking in Ponzi cases. But
given the number of jurisdictions and the growth in the Ponzi scheme
largesse, there is a “potential for inconsistent results, delayed
adjudication, and skyrocketing costs.” 277
271 In re Int. Mgmt. Assocs. LLC, No. A06–62966–PWB, 2009 WL 6506657, *9–10
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009), aff’d, No. 10–10683, 2011 WL 5103951 (Oct. 27, 2011).
272 Perkins v. Haines, No. 10–10683, 2011 WL 5103951, at *4 (11th Cir. Oct. 27, 2011).
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 See, e.g., Karen E. Nelson, Note, Turning Winners into Losers: Ponzi Scheme
Avoidance Law and the Inequity of Clawbacks, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1456, 1480–89 (2011)
(arguing that courts should expand the definition of value to account for both the time value and
opportunity costs of withdrawals in order to arrive at a more equitable solution for winning
investors).
276 In re IMA, 2009 WL 6506657, at *10; see Pepper v. Litton 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939)
(noting that bankruptcy courts “have been invoked to the end that fraud will not prevail, that
substance will not give way to form, that technical considerations will not prevent substantial
justice from being done”).
277 Tally M. Weiner, On the Clawbacks in the Madoff Liquidation Proceeding, 15
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 221, 236 (2009) (discussing clawbacks, preferences, and
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IV. DIMINISHING RETURNS OF GOOD FAITH
The demolition of the good faith defense for investors in cash-in,
cash-out Ponzi schemes (where “debts were incurred as part of an
extraordinary and unlawful enterprise and payments came from other
people’s money”) 278 leaves a sour taste in the mouth. Yet, to effect a
primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Code (i.e., equality of the
distribution), it is a necessary evil. And it would ensure that all
creditors—not just the most friendly, necessary, lucky and/or
aggressive creditors—recover at least part of their claims.
The key question is often, in the case of innocent investor-victims:
were the investors expecting a commercially reasonable rate of return,
for “equivalent value and good faith,” or were they relying on
promises that were, in essence, “too good to be true”?279 In In re
Carrozzella & Richardson, the Court found that guaranteed fifteen
percent interest payments were reasonable and treated the payments
as favorably as any other trade creditor, like the utility company. 280
On the other hand, another court found returns of twelve to twentyfour percent to be an unreasonable rate of return in the context of a
Ponzi scheme. 281 This split between the courts further perpetuates
inconsistency and unpredictability. For some, section 548(c) provides
a total shield from a clawback action, but for others the defense is
more of a brass ring hanging just out of reach.
In other cases, courts assign different levels of fiduciary
responsibility depending on the role the investor plays in the overall
scheme. 282 Sometimes, courts view innocent investors as partially
responsible for perpetuating a Ponzi fraud, justifying their
susceptibility to a clawback. 283 Courts raise the bar of responsibility
even higher for brokers that feed hungry investors into Ponzi
schemes. While many brokers are unknowing co-conspirators, they
do earn commissions for placing customers with the fraudulent funds.

fraudulent transfers in the Madoff Ponzi scheme).
278 Id. at 224.
279 Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480, 491 (D. Conn. 2002).
280 Id. at 483–84, 484 n.7, 490–91.
281 See In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 972, 985–86 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (finding that
the investors did not give reasonably equivalent value).
282 See, e.g., In re Int. Mgmt. Assocs. LLC, No. A06–62966–PWB, 2009 WL 6498191, at
*3–4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009) (discussing the potential different levels of responsibility
of debt and equity investors).
283 E.g., In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 286 B.R. at 488 (“Further, by helping the debtor
perpetuate his illegal scheme, the transfers between the debtor and investors only exacerbated
the harm to the debtor's creditors by increasing the amount of claims, while diminishing the
debtor's estate.”).
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The commissions they receive from Ponzi funds are prone to
avoidance actions, and some courts reject a good faith defense as
applied to their role of steering investors to Ponzi funds. 284 In World
Vision, not only did the court reject the brokers’ good faith defense,
but it also deemed their actions of soliciting new investors, which
perpetuated the illegal Ponzi scheme, to be fraudulent. 285
As IMA, World Vision, Bayou III, and Bayou IV demonstrate, the
applicability and even definition of good faith is in flux. Additionally,
the iterations of good faith from these cases fail to address the reality
that early investors benefit from the misfortunes of subsequent
investors. Holding fast to the antediluvian concepts of good faith
effectively slaps a tiny Band-Aid on a gaping wound. The status quo
contributes to drawn-out litigation over the standards, customs,
practices, sophistication, and experience generally possessed by the
individual investors—and that is just to establish inquiry notice. Once
the investor is on inquiry notice, there is still another layer of
litigation remaining that considers whether a “diligent investigation”
would have discovered the fraudulent purpose of the transfer. The
Bayou good faith litigation boiled down to a question over the
investors’ knowledge or suspicions about “some potential infirmity”
that would trigger an investigation into their investment.286 But
questioning what a “reasonably prudent institutional hedge fund
investor” would do diminishes an already starved estate. In contrast,
eliminating the good faith defense focuses on the real problem of
maximizing those assets for the benefit of all investors. The Madoff
case typifies how the bacteria of good faith can infect even the
fundamental chore of calculating loss.
A. Picking the Carcass: Madoff Math
As explained above, Ponzi scheme investors fall into two
categories: “net winners” and “net losers.” Net winners received
payments from the Ponzi scheme greater than they originally
invested. On the other hand, net losers withdrew less than the original
investment.287 Ponzi investors largely fall into the latter category, and
often come closer to financial devastation when the scheme
284 See Cuthill v. Greenmark, LLC (In re World Vision Entm’t, Inc.), 275 B.R. 641, 658–
61 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (rejecting such a defense).
285 Id. at 657.
286 Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re Bayou Grp.,
LLC), 396 B.R. 810, 848 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 439 B.R. 284
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
287 See McDermott, supra note 1, at 164–69 (discussing the reasonably equivalent value
test for constructive fraud).
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unravels. 288 Compounding the misery felt after investors realize their
retirement, income, and investments are worthless, the trustee sends
the dreaded clawback letter that demands a turnover of any and all
money withdrawn from the scheme in the past two (and sometimes as
high as six) years or face legal action.289
In the Madoff case, the trustee, Irving H. Picard, stated that the
letters were not intended to affect “net losers,” those who lost and
only received part, if any, of their principal investment back from the
perpetrator(s) of the Ponzi fraud. 290 Nonetheless, the demand letters
insisted on the return of 100 percent of the funds withdrawn from
Madoff accounts—principals and profits—within the maximum
allowed statutory period of six years.291 Picard’s demand included
charitable institutions and was not, in that regard, unprecedented.292
The Madoff trustee and some investors, like those in Bayou II,
championed the “net equity” method and demanded that the “net
winners” return their “profits” to insure a more equitable distribution
of funds. 293 Under net equity, a court determines the investors’ losses
based on their actual losses in investing with Madoff.294 The
opponents of this method, on the other hand, wanted a “last statement
balance” method to determine losses. Under this method, even the
“net winners” would have a claim for loss against the Ponzi debtor
based on the balances reflected on their last statements before
Madoff’s scheme collapsed.
The bankruptcy court settled the debate over the scope of Madoff
investors’ liability to the Securities Investors Protection Corporation
(“SIPC”). 295 The ruling granted Picard’s request to apply the “net
288 Id.
289 See, e.g., Christopher Scinta et al., Madoff Trustee Demands Investors Return $735
Million,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
23,
2009,
5:47
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=apnVhVeUN7O8.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 544, the trustee may bootstrap state fraudulent transfer law onto a
section 548 claim. Doing so expands the look back window to the time period provided by state
law. In the Madoff case, New York law provided that transactions up to six years prior to a
bankruptcy could be avoided. Id. Thus, the possible defendants increased exponentially with the
expanded window of opportunity.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 See Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 759–61 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing a similar
attempt to clawback funds from charitable institutions).
293 Secs. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs., LLC (In re Bernard L.
Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC), 424 B.R. 122, 125 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).The Trustee defines Net
Equity as the amount of cash deposited by the customer into his BLMIS customer account less
any amounts already withdrawn by him (the “Net Investment Method”). Id.
294 Id.
295 Id. “The Securities Investor Protection Corporation either acts as trustee or works with
an independent court-appointed trustee in a missing asset case to recover funds. The statute that
created SIPC provides that customers of a failed brokerage firm receive all non-negotiable
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equity” method. 296 As mentioned previously, Madoff’s investment
house was liquidated under SIPA, and the decision precluded
retention of withdrawals for many of the Madoff investors.297
Investors’ claims against the Madoff Ponzi scheme equaled the
difference between the cash paid into a “Madoff-Ponzi” account and
the amount withdrawn prior to the collapse of the scheme. 298 In other
words, the “net equity” calculation prevailed. Under this calculation,
early investors, the so-called “net winners,” will be both subject to
avoidance of their profits and ineligible for publically-funded SIPC
investment insurance payments of up to half a million dollars. 299 The
ruling reflects judges’ general historical unwillingness to base losses
on the fantasy worlds concocted by Madoff and his predecessors. Or,
as Judge Lifland eloquently stated: “It would be simply absurd to
credit the fraud and legitimize the phantom world created by
Madoff. . . .” 300
To a large extent, under both SIPA and bankruptcy law, the
debtor’s assets—in the form of cash and securities—get lumped
together and distributed pro rata among the investors, based on the
theory of “net equity.” 301 Section 78lll(11) of SIPA defines “net
equity” to be:
[T]he dollar amount of the account or accounts of a
customer, 302 to be determined by—
(A) calculating the sum which would have been owed
by the debtor to such customer if the debtor had
liquidated, by sale or purchase on the filing date, all
securities positions of such customer (other than
customer name securities reclaimed by such
customer); minus

securities that are already registered in their names or in the process of being registered.” Who
Are We, SECS. INVESTOR PROT. CORP., http://www.sipc.org/who/who.cfm (last visited Sept. 4,
2011).
296 Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs., 424 B.R. at 125.
297 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. (2006).
298 Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Judge Endorses Trustee’s Rule on Losses, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2010, at B1.
299 Id.
300 Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs., 424 B.R. at 140.
301 15 U.S.C. § 78lll(11).
302 SIPA and cases like Madoff use the term “customer.” For purposes of this Article, the
term “investor” will be used generally to include “customer.”
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(B) any indebtedness of such customer to the debtor
on the filing date; plus
(C) any payment by such customer of such
indebtedness to the debtor which is made with the
approval of the trustee and within such period as the
trustee may determine. . . . 303
If the assets fail to satisfy the investors’ claims in full, then the
investors may be entitled to an advance from the SIPC up to $500,000
for securities claims and $100,000 for cash claims. 304
The Madoff case—a mess from the beginning—boiled over when
the trustee calculated that the amount of each Madoff investor’s net
equity equaled the amount of cash deposited by the investor into its
BLMIS account, without interest, less any cash withdrawals (the “Net
Investment Method”). 305 As a result of this approach, any Madoff
victims who withdrew more cash than deposited (i.e., the “net
winners”) could not receive an SIPC advance, regardless of whether
the investor relied upon the phony BLMIS account statements in good
faith. 306
Understandably, investors decried what they believed to be just
one more level of victimization perpetrated by the Madoff scam. As
opposed to the Net Investment Method, a large portion of the
investors, especially the early ones, argued that the investors’
expectations, which were based on their most recent BLMIS account
statement, should control the determination of net equity (“Last
Statement Method”).307 The bankruptcy court sided with the trustee
on the Net Investment Method. 308 The bankruptcy court focused on
the term “securities positions” in the definition of “net equity” under
SIPA, and held that an investor’s position could only be determined
by examining the debtor’s books and records to verify the actual
securities positions held. 309 BLMIS’s records exposed the hard truth
that Madoff never purchased any securities. And the only verifiable
amounts in an investor’s account constituted hard cash in and hard
cash out. 310

303 15

U.S.C. § 78lll(11) (emphasis added).
L. Madoff Inv. Secs., 424 B.R. at 137–38.
305 Id. at 124.
306 Id. at 132.
307 Id. at 135.
308 Id. at 141.
309 Id. at 135.
310 Id.
304 Bernard
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In its decision, the bankruptcy court used two Second Circuit
opinions from In re New Times Securities Services, Inc. litigation to
support the Madoff math. 311 New Times had some parallel facts—
including a broker who managed to purchase not a single investment
for any of the scheme’s customers.312 Likewise, the New Times
opinions rejected investors’ “expectations” as the proper
measurement of securities positions. 313 Unlike Madoff, however, the
New Times trustee differentiated between investors whose accounts
demonstrated actual securities that had never been purchased, and
consequently applied the Last Statement Method to those investors. 314
Madoff, however, held that the imaginary trading prices of “real”
securities propounded by Madoff matched his fabrication of wholly
nonexistent securities. In other words, the bankruptcy court in Madoff
departed from the New Times method of attributing some “legitimate
expectations” to the loss and instead spread the loss more evenly by
equivocating false trading prices to false investments.315
That result makes sense. Because Madoff used fictional prices and
investments, the entire scheme reeked of fraud. Investors’ net equity
could not be apportioned under the New Times method. 316 Had the
bankruptcy court followed the “Last Statement” approach, then the
net winners could have received a recovery windfall at the expense of
the net losers. 317 Moreover, the definition of “net equity” in SIPA
does not include “legitimate expectations.” SIPA in its entirety lacks
the phrase “legitimate expectations.” 318 The profits reflected on the
final account statements in Madoff were “arbitrary[,] . . . divorced
from market reality[,] . . . . unbounded by the limitations of realmarket trading, [and] entirely engineered by a con man.” 319
Legitimate expectations cannot supplant the fantasy world that
Madoff created. Nonetheless, Madoff math is something the
bankruptcy court left with a question mark, much like the IMA
decision on “for value.” Recognizing the forthcoming hullaballoo, the
311 Stafford v. Giddens (In re New Times Secs. Servs., Inc.), 463 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006);
In re New Times Secs. Servs., Inc., 371 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2004).
312 New Times Secs. Servs., 371 F.3d at 71–2.
313 See, e.g., id. at 87–8 (rejecting the district court’s calculation which was based on
legitimate expectatations).
314 See Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs., 424 B.R. at 139 (discussing the difference).
315 Id. at 140.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 139.
318 15 U.S.C. §§ 78lll(11), 78fff–2(b).
319 Brief for Trustee-Appellee Irving H. Picard at 33 In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment
Securities LLC, 10–2378–bk(L), 2011 WL 3568936 (2d. Cir. Aug. 16, 2011) (No. 10–2378–
bk(L)),
2010
WL
3736776,
available
at
http://www.madoff-help.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/09/picard_appeal_brief.pdf.
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bankruptcy court certified a direct appeal to the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals. 320 On August 16, 2011, the Second Circuit affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s use of the net investment method as the proper
calculation of the investors’ net equity. 321
The math is tricky, but so is the risk. The investors argue that it
should not matter whether their loss was the product of fraud or just
bad business investment and market upheaval. Some critics have
assailed the bankruptcy court for shifting the risk from the SIPC to
the Madoff investors. 322 But the other side of the coin is also true:
investments bring a certain amount of risk to anyone—from the 401K
contributor to the savviest on Wall Street—and risk is apportioned
between all the players, whether the SIPC, the market, or the
individual investors. With risk comes liability, and investors can be
held liable when they receive what is not theirs. 323
B. Supersizing SIPA and Section 548(c)
Cases like Bayou, IMA, and Madoff have curtailed investors’
abilities to retain their withdrawals. But the voices of the net winners
are powerful. And Congress is listening. As the 111th Congress came
to a close, New Jersey Representative Scott Garrett, the chairman of
the House Financial Services Capital Markets and Government
Sponsored Enterprises subcommittee, introduced House Bill 6531.
The legislation would restrict court-appointed trustees’ power to
initiate clawback suits against the net winners. 324
The Equitable Treatment of Investors Act, if enacted, would
amend the 1970 Securities Investor Protection Act to require that
trustees apportion claims of loss according to final account
statements, except where the investor knew that the failed broker-

320 Id.

at 3–4.
re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, No. 10–2378–bk(L), 2011 WL
3568936 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2011).
322 Kaja Whitehouse, Madoff Winners Go for ‘Losers’ Pennant, NEW YORK POST (March
3,
2011),
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/court_gestures_3BMq6Mr9x2BzuGWHfiXfwN.
323 A trustee has authority under SIPA to recover property constituting a fraudulent transfer
when there are not sufficient funds to pay in full the claims of investors. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff–
2(c)(3); see also Picard v. Taylor (In re Park South Sec., LLC.), 326 B.R. 505, 512 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a SIPA trustee has standing to avoid fraudulent transfers); In re
Adler Coleman Clearing Corp., 195 B.R. 266, 273–75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing the
SIPA trustee’s role in a brokerage house’s liquidation).
324 H.R. Res. 6531, 111th Cong. (2011). This bill was again revived in May 2011 by
Congressman Gary Ackerman, a Senior Member of the House Financial Services Committee.
Ackerman Introduces Legislation to Provide Relief for Victims of Bernard Madoff & All
Investors Defrauded by Ponzi Schemes, CONGRESSMAN GARY ACKERMAN (May 31, 2011),
http://ackerman.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=253&itemid=1644.
321 In
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dealer was involved in fraud. 325 SIPA currently provides that
investors may recover their “net equity,” but it does not specify the
formula for calculating that amount. 326 The revision’s proponents’
concern is that Madoff investors are in the position of owing rather
than recovering from the bankruptcy estate.
Unfortunately, that concern belies the true import of House Bill
6531, which in practice would place the interests of net winners at the
top of the food chain to feed off the net losers. In addition, it would
nearly preempt a bankruptcy trustee’s ability to clawback fictitious
profits from the net winners. 327 By contrast, if a trustee is permitted to
recover fictitious profits from the investors, they get pooled into a
fund where all investors will receive a share of the monies based upon
a pro-rata distribution. A pro-rata distribution is a more equitable
scheme than House Bill 6531’s proposal. Excluding the good faith
defense from Ponzi scheme cases would further streamline difficult
Ponzi cases. And it would create a more equitable distribution that
aligns investors, the law, and policy rather than producing the
favoritism inherent in House Bill 6531.
The absolute removal of the good faith defense works for three
reasons. First, a Ponzi scheme has no actual “profits,” just money
stolen from new participants:
If a person invests money with the understanding that he will
share in the profits produced by his investment, and it turns
out that there are no profits, it is difficult to see how that
person can make a claim to receive any more than the return
of his principal investment. 328
Words cannot produce cash, so the “false representation by the Ponzi
schemer that he is paying the investor his share of the profits, which
are in fact nothing more than funds invested by other victims, cannot
alter the fact that there are no profits to share.”329
Second, investors cannot have a legitimate expectation in
distributions—or in account statements reflecting “profits”—that act
to perpetuate a fraud. Payments of fictitious profits, and account
statements showing additional fictitious profits, are used to bait and
trap new investors and continue the Ponzi scheme for as long as

325 H.R.

Res 6531.
U.S.C. § 78lll(11).
327 H.R. Res. 6531.
328 Lustig v. Weisz & Assocs., Inc. (In re Unified Comm. Capital), No. 01–MBK–6004L,
2002 WL 32500567, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002).
329 Id.
326 15
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possible. 330 These “profits” are subsidized by later investors who are
left with an empty pot when the scheme collapses. 331 The good faith
defense might give credence to investor’s innocent assumption that
her profits were real, but it cannot, nor should it, change the fact that
her profits were make-believe.
Third, an investor cannot have a legitimate expectation of actual
value in excess of the principal investment because such transfers
lack reasonably equivalent value. Courts have routinely held that
investors have no legitimate claim to the “profits” of a Ponzi scheme
where they transferred nothing in exchange for those ill-gotten
gains. 332 Ponzi schemes are not like collapsed financial companies,
which SIPA and SIPC were designed to manage. Had the investments
been genuine, the investors would have actually paid for the
securities, which promised a set rate of return. If that company tanks
due to fraud or mismanagement, then investors can and have a right to
recover securities they had paid for, and would have had in their
accounts.333
In those cases, the “legitimate expectation” would be supported by
the contents of the books and records. In Ponzi schemes, and the
Madoff case in particular, investors deposit funds insufficient to
obtain the fictitious securities listed on their account statements.The
funds then used to “purchase” the securities were the fictitious
“profits” of earlier bogus transactions. Furthermore, investors could
not have obtained those returns because the trades themselves
ultimately turned out to be manufactured. Consequently, calculating
net equity in a Ponzi scheme to reflect the final account statements
would effectively credit the fictional proceeds of the fraud.334 Thus,
the confluence of the good faith defense, House Bill 6531, and the
impracticable net equity calculation would create a perfect storm
where the net losers inevitably live up to their label and suffer to prop
up the net winners. 335
330 See, e.g., SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., No. 99 CIV.11395 RWS, 2000 WL 1752979, at
*40 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2000) (“[R]ecognizing claims to profits from an illegal financial
scheme is contrary to public policy because it serves to legitimate the scheme.”).
331 Id.
332 See Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 1995) (Ponzi scheme investor “is
entitled to his profit only if the payment of that profit to him, which reduced the net assets of the
estate now administered by the receiver, was offset by an equivalent benefit to the estate.”)
333 For such an example, see Stafford v. Giddens (In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc.), 463
F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006).
334 The “winners” in the Ponzi scheme, even if innocent of any fraud themselves, should
not be permitted to “enjoy an advantage over later investors sucked into the Ponzi scheme who
were not so lucky.” Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589,
596 (9th Cir. 1991).
335 See Dick Carozza, Balancing Act: An Interview with Irving H. Picard, Madoff Trustee,
FRAUD MAGAZINE, July/August 2010, at 36–41 (discussing the Madoff liquidation’s winners
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While House Bill 6531 is by no means a free pass for the net
winners; it will reduce the settlements and ultimately the recoveries
that Ponzi scheme trustees will be able to negotiate in these cases. 336
Avoidance actions are often vehicles of settlement. Since the
bankruptcy estate has little money to spare, the expense and time of
the additional litigation imposed by the good faith defense and House
Bill 6531, if enacted, directly affects the size of the estate that
benefits all creditors. 337 The overt expanse of SIPA coupled with the
more clandestine advance of the good faith defense may protect the
net winners. But it will also further entomb the net losers under the
morass of Ponzi litigation. While some net winners are the most
innocent of investors, there are also the “feeder funds” that were—by
Bernie Madoff’s own self-serving admission—“complicit” in the
fraud by turning a blind eye to suspicious returns. 338 Yet these feeder
funds have powerful lobbyists and litigators at their disposal.
The proposed revisions to the SIPA fail to adequately or
realistically take into account the overall impact that the proposed
amendments would have on the SIPC’s trustee’s ability to effectively
mitigate the damages left after the storm, or how such new legislation
would affect innocent investors that become a part of the Ponzi
scheme later in the game. 339 The proposed amendments would shift
focus to the time at which an investor entered the scheme. 340 The
general idea behind the changes praises the impulse of “the earlier the
better.” Net winners would be able to realize funds that were
withdrawn in excess of their original investment because of the time
at which they entered the scheme. 341
The proposed revisions to the SIPA fail to recognize that the net
winners would be rewarded for perpetuating and funding the Ponzi

and losers), available at http://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.aspx?id=4294967939.
336 See, e.g., Bob Van Voris, Madoff Trustee Says he Found $1.5 B for Fraud Victims,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, April 10, 2010 (discussing the settlements in the Madoff case), available at
CHRON BUSINESS, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/6953339.html (last visited
Sept. 17, 2011).
337 Cf. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(discussing the similar due-diligence defense in securities litigation).
338 See Diana Henriques, Madoff Says From Prison That Banks “Had to Know”, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, at A1 (reporting Madoff as saying that banks had to know of his scheme
based on returns); Karen Freifeld, Madoff Feeder Fund Adviser Merkin Accused in Lawsuit of
Breaching
Duty,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
(Sept.
17,
2010,
4:54
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-17/ezra-merkin-sued-by-fraud-negligence-byreceiver-for-madoff-feeder-funds.html.
339 See H.R. Res. 6531, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing revisions to SIPA).
340 Id.
341 Id.
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scheme, albeit unknowingly. 342 This notion turns to the question of
why the amended SIPC does not employ a strict liability standard.343
The term “net winner” is inapposite with the term Ponzi scheme. The
amendments should allow the trustee to recover any withdrawals
made up to two years before the bankruptcy—whether amounting to
principle or fictitious profit—for the benefit of all the Ponzi scheme’s
victims. 344 The proposed amendments do precisely the opposite. The
amendments base priority only on the time that a particular investor
entered the scheme, 345 which thwarts a premier policy goal of the
Bankruptcy Code: equality of distribution.
Remunerating early investors at the expense of later investors
hardly comports with the equitable nature of the Bankruptcy Code.
Distinguishing between equally culpable parties on the basis of timing
thwarts the very fairness that bankruptcy attempts to achieve. The
amount of money and the number of players involved in such
schemes makes the utilization of a strict liability regime even more
attractive. And it is the most just and efficient way to unweave the
tangled web of financial lies that Ponzi schemes create. Without the
so-called net winners, there could not be a category of net losers.
If either faction of investors is more culpable, it is the net winners.
Their investments funded the scheme; their returns induced the net
losers to enter the scheme. But the proposed amendments to the SIPA
effectively say that the investors that entered the scheme later, i.e., the
net losers, are more gullible and thus should bear the brunt end of the
stick.
Professor Coffee at Columbia University, illustrating the pitfalls of
the possible SIPA amendments, argued before the House Financial
Services Committee that Congress should not, as House Bill 6531’s
predecessor would, “subordinate the interests of net losers to those of
net winners” or “limit[] the powers of the SIPC trustee to sue the net
winners in a Ponzi scheme.” 346 A Ponzi scheme’s fraudulent nature
blurs the role that net winners play in perpetuating the fraud. Despite
342 See Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 771 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing net winners and
losers in Ponzi schemes).
343 But see H.R. Res. 6531, Sec. 2(d), 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing that courts should use
the last statement, even if fabricated, to determine investor equity).
344 Cf. Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 221 (1941) (holding that a
creditor of bankrupt’s corporation was entitled only to pari passu participation with bankrupt’s
individual creditors).
345 H.R. Res. 6531, 111th Cong. (2010).
346 Assessing the Limitations of the Securities Investor Protection Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th Cong. 12–13 (2010) (testimony of Professor John C. Coffee,
Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/Media/file/hearings/111/Coffee092310.pdf.
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that role, House Bill 6531 would ultimately guarantee advantageous
gains for the net winners. 347
Professor Coffee also points out—rightly so—that amending SIPA
only deals with cases pursued under that statute. In actuality, SIPA
cannot be applied “to the vast majority of Ponzi schemes, which are
typically carried out by persons other than brokers and dealers,
because SIPA only applies to the insolvency of a brokerage firm.” 348
An illustration demonstrates this:
[I]f a traditional con man takes money from investors, telling
them that he is investing in real estate, diamonds, currency
transactions or whatever, the trustee in this proceeding will be
able to bring avoidance actions against the Net Winners on
behalf of the Net Losers, because this trustee is not governed
by SIPA. 349
Amending SIPA would limit the trustee’s ability to make the victims
whole, or as close to whole as possible given the circumstances. And
it would provide no incentive for investors to exercise due diligence
when making investment decisions of the sort seen in recent Ponzi
schemes.
The most effective way to ensure that the innocent victims of
Ponzi schemes are made as close to whole as possible would be to
implement a strict liability framework. The proposed amendments, as
they currently stand, allow arguably the most culpable investors, the
net winners, to become mega-winners by allowing them to take more
than their initial investments. Any excess recoveries obtained by the
SIPA trustee should be distributed on a pro-rata basis, not based on
the time that investors entered the scheme. Removing the good faith
defense from the equation not only puts net winners and net losers on
a level playing field, but also reduces the disproportionate treatment
that results from the caste-like system of classifying investors as
winners and losers.
C. Criminal Competition
Recovery by a trustee presupposes two things: (a) that the Ponzi
schemer has not transferred, hid, sold, or given away assets never to
be found; and (b) that the federal government did not get the first bite
at the apple. By the time Scott Rothstein was charged with
347 See id. at 64–77 (written testimony of Professor Coffee) (discussing H.R. 5032, H.R.
6531’s predecessor and arguing against its adoption).
348 Id. at 68.
349 Id.

11/8/2011 5:27:17 PM

70

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

racketeering, money laundering, and fraud stemming from his
cleverly orchestrated cash-on-settlement Ponzi scheme, his white
Lamborghini, 304 pieces of jewelry, eighty-seven-foot yacht and
other assets were already in the hands of the federal government. 350
While bankruptcy is a powerful tool for finding and allocating assets,
it is not the only tool.351 Increasingly, civil and criminal forfeiture
have entered the formerly exclusive sphere of bankruptcy, taking and
dispersing assets without the strict statutory rules of priority,
preference, and fraudulent transfer that make bankruptcy, at its best,
an organized and predictable process.
Creditors of Scott Rothstein found themselves floundering when
the Federal government stepped in and seized all of Rothstein’s assets
before an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding could get underway. 352
Rothstein, a prominent Ponzi schemer who sold fictitious settlement
annuities in exchange for lump sums, built a $1.2 billion empire, only
to watch it crumble as the bubble burst and investors worldwide came
to their senses. Investors and creditors who had hoped for some slight
return of their principle, even at pennies on the dollar, were
disappointed when federal prosecutors swooped in to grab the pot.353
Naturally, this is troubling. Forfeiture laws were initially created as
a way of dealing with large racketeering organizations, such as drug
cartels. By attacking assets directly, prosecutors could weaken
organizations broadly, easing the process of going after individuals
and leaders within those organizations. 354 Forfeiture of this nature is
tailor-made for crimes with no clear victims. By contrast, Ponzi
schemes leave a clear and well-defined trail of victims, and seizing
assets for distribution at the government’s whim makes no more sense
than keeping a stolen car from its rightful owner because it is now
tainted as the “proceeds of a crime.” 355 Naturally, a lot of the money
forfeited is returned to creditors and investors, but there are no
guarantees to ensure that this happens. And creditors have few
avenues for complaint if the money is not returned.
This has led to some bitterness between federal prosecutors and
bankruptcy trustees, both of whom are fulfilling public duties with
350 Jacqueline Palank, Prosecutors, Trustees Fight for Dominance In Ponzi Bankruptcies,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
3,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704111504576059613947208394.html.
351 See 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2006) (providing for forfeiture of criminal property).
352 Palank, supra note 353.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 See Michael S. Linscott, Asset Forfeiture (Modern Anti-Drug Weapon): Is Bankruptcy
a “Defense”?, 25 TULSA L.J. 617, 619 (1990) (discussing the origin and use of criminal
forfeiture statutes).
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conflicting mandates. Judges have proven unpredictable on the issue
of just where the assets should remain, resulting in what looks like a
zero sum game between trustees and prosecutors in many cases. 356
Prosecutors cite the expense of bankruptcy proceedings as a reason to
deal with stolen assets directly, while bankruptcy trustees argue that
what that expense buys is a fair process shaped by decades of case
law and judicial experience. 357 Even when compromises are reached,
there is no shortage of bitterness.
A resolution must be reached to allow bankruptcy courts to
function properly in large-scale fraud cases. 358 Without the assurance
of a clearly defined set of preference rules, investors may rush to grab
their money before the government can get a hold of it. Interested
parties are bound to incur additional and unnecessary administrative
costs due to the lack of clear boundaries and jurisdictional rules
between prosecutors and bankruptcy courts. These costs will only
further the need for more forfeiture money to keep the wheels
greased. Until then, too many cooks spoil the soup.
D. Clawback Chaos: Striking a Balance Between Cause and Effect
Victims of Ponzi schemes, whether blue-collar workers, doctors,
lawyers, financiers or captains of industry, all make the same mistake.
They make a leap of faith for a friend or a confident salesman who
seems to have all the answers, and they pay dearly. Generally, people
have a certain amount of sympathy; we all make decisions sometimes
without doing the necessary research, or act on a hunch, or even make
a loan to a friend without the possibility of repayment. The
Bankruptcy Code reflects this sympathy in section 548(c). Because
good faith should be an objective inquiry, its applicability should not
depend upon the status of the transferee. But the cases demonstrate
the opposite effect. Courts often allow a creditor to keep a transfer
that might normally be avoidable if he withdrew his money in good
faith.

356 See id. at 623–35 (outlining the zero sum nature of the proceedings between trustees
and prosecutors).
357 See generally Myron M. Sheinfeld, Teresa L. Maines, & Mark W. Wege, Civil
Forfeiture and Bankruptcy: The Conflicting Interests of the Debtor, Its Creditors and the
Government, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87 (1995) (highlighting the differences of opinion).
358 See, e.g., id. at 88 (urging bankruptcy courts to exercise their jurisdiction over forfeited
property).
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1. Ponzi Policy
At bottom, the good faith defense is intuitively equitable: Parties
who do not know why they are withdrawing are not punished.
Further, the good faith defense might encourage investors to report a
Ponzi scheme immediately, not simply make a run for the money.
But, on the other hand, the good faith defense might encourage
investors to withdraw their investments and attempt to create the
appearance of good faith.
The good faith defense is already quite weak. First, it consumes
court resources. Second, it is not well defined in Ponzi cases—
somewhat counter intuitively given the label of objectivity.
In the Bankruptcy Code, sections 547 and 548 demonstrate the
conflicting results based upon the same set of facts. Preferences are
avoided if transferred to third parties in the ninety days before
bankruptcy. Fraudulent transfers have a two-year reach-back period.
Why is it that under section 547, the Ponzi scheme investor largely
has, by virtue of case law, no defense to an avoidance action? On the
other hand, section 548 provides a good faith defense to the same
types of transactions—the only difference being when the transfer
took place. While the Code embodies a good faith defense regardless
of circumstance, it does not define good faith in terms of knowledge
and does not expressly exclude nor include the consideration of
negligence. In Ponzi schemes the need for a good faith standard fails
to reach the paramount significance it attains in non-Ponzi cases. 359
Federal and state fraudulent conveyance statutes implement a
policy of preventing the diminution of a debtor’s estate. 360 In an effort
to force the “square peg facts of a ‘Ponzi’ scheme into the round holes
of the fraudulent conveyance statutes,” 361 the law is subpar. The case
law regarding the applicability of the good faith defense in Ponzi
schemes is inconsistent. Courts are unpredictable and decisions are
vulnerable to reversal.
Congress should specify that a transfer of funds for a period of
time prior to bankruptcy, preferably one year instead of the two
provided by the statute, cannot be considered value or to be made in
good faith when the bankrupt entity was engaged in a pure Ponzi
scheme. That would be far more tenable than the current system,
359 See Gill v. Winn (In re Perma Pac. Props., Inc.), 983 F.2d 964, 968 (10th Cir. 1992)
(finding “no impediment to allowing the bankruptcy court to look at the nature of the transaction
and the relationship among the parties”).
360 Lustig v. Weisz & Assocs., Inc. (In re Unified Commercial Capital, Inc.), 260 B.R. 343,
352 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001).
361 Id. at 350.
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under which courts are accused of ignoring “what is clearly value and
fair consideration under the applicable fraudulent conveyance
statutes.” 362 Eliminating the good faith defense would level the
imbalance between net winners and net losers in Ponzi schemes. It
would also correct the myopic situation that sometimes results in
investors recouping “profits” ahead of those who have yet to recover
principal. 363
Ponzi schemes are different from the garden variety fraudulent
transfer case. The good faith defense is an accepted fundamental
commercial principal that when one loans money to an entity for a
period of time in good faith, that person has given value and is
entitled to a reasonable return. 364 Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code
must be mindful not to step on the toes of the state-law equivalents of
section 548, largely based on either the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act or the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 365 It must
also stay within the bounds of the two-year look-back window or—if
more palatable—be limited to one year prior to the filing of a
bankruptcy. 366
Investors accept a series of risks when they deposit substantial
sums into a Ponzi scheme (or the feeder funds that push them there).
They understand that their principal might be lost, partially or
completely, and that recovery of their contractual interest may be
impossible. Those risks include the risk that the investment might
later turn out to be part of a Ponzi scheme. 367
To be sure, the notion of eliminating the good faith defense will
make many cringe. Some may argue that the same result should then
362 Id.
363 See, e.g., Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 856–62 (D.
Utah 1987) (addressing such a situation). Numerous injustices flow from courts’ allowing netwinning investors to retain fictitious profits. For example, it (1) diminishes the debtor’s estate,
so that there is less available for other innocent investors; (2) does not come from profits or even
independent cash flow generated by the debtor, but is paid from the funds of other innocent
investors; (3) unjustly enriches that innocent investor victim at the expense of other innocent
investors who did not recover all of their principal; and (4) furthers the fraudulent scheme. Id.
364 Id. at 861 (construing 11 U.S.C. § 548(c)).
365 First Nat’l Bank of Barnesville v. Rafoth (In re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs., Inc.), 974
F.2d 712, 716–17 (6th Cir. 1992) (analyzing both state statutes and the uniform code
provisions); Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589, 593–97
(9th Cir. 1991) (analyzing “the state statutes and the Code provisions contemporaneously”).
366 Prior to 2006, fraudulent transfer actions were limited to a one-year look back period.
See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (Comment on Amendments and n.1, 2009 Collier Pamphlet Edition)
(stating that the pre–2005 Amendment avoidance period of one year remains applicable with
respect to cases filed before April 21, 2006).
367 See Sender v. Buchanan (In re Hedged-Inv. Assocs.), 84 F.3d 1286, 1290 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding that the contractual interest portion of a Ponzi investment is recoverable as
fraudulent transfer); In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 985–86 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (same);
Abbott, 77 B.R. at 886 (same).
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hold true to the scheme’s payment of day-to-day operation costs like
utility, office supplies, and other expenses. That argument, however,
is beyond the scope of this article. Good faith is generally a question
of fact, but for Ponzi scheme cases its application should be one of
law. Much like a statute of limitations operates on a fraudulent
transfer action itself, so too should it dictate the reach of the good
faith defense.
Congress should amend section 548(c) for Ponzi schemes to
reallocate the risks and redistribute the losses occasioned by a
bankrupt entity that engaged in a Ponzi scheme. To act, Congress
must believe that the result is a fair and equitable solution. But if
Congress does nothing, inconsistent case law will continue to skew
cases in varied directions. That variation will result in both a onesided solution and partial injustice.
On the other hand, Congress should carefully craft any amendment
so that section 548 does not become a fraudulent transfer statute on
steroids. Indeed, the window of foreclosure on the good faith defense
should be limited to one, or, at most, two years. And it should only
apply in pure Ponzi schemes. 368 Anything less has the effect of
trampling on the investors already at the bottom of barrel. Anything
more creates an invincible beast.
2. Innocent Investor v. Hungry Financier
A shift in a substantive portion of Bankruptcy Code to reflect what
already exists in bankruptcy policy and practice protects the interests
of all investors in Ponzi schemes. Investors will continue to suffer
from the “too-good-to-be-true” reality of a Ponzi scheme. But at the
end of the day, equity should be shared instead of tilted to one side.
Ponzi schemes have a number of special statuses both in and out of
bankruptcy courts. They are presumed insolvent from the moment of
their inception, any transfers made to investors are fraudulent, and
good faith is the sole viable defense to avoidance. In order to establish
368 The term Ponzi scheme derives from the original Ponzi scheme case, and what Chief
Justice Taft described as “the remarkable criminal financial career of Charles Ponzi.”
Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7 (1924). In its most pure form, a Ponzi scheme consists of:

[A] fraudulent arrangement in which an entity makes payments to investors from
monies obtained from later investors rather than from any “profits” of the underlying
business venture. The fraud consists of funneling proceeds received from new
investors to previous investors in the guise of profits from the alleged business
venture, thereby cultivating an illusion that a legitimate profit-making business
opportunity exists and inducing further investment.
Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589, 590 n.1 (9th Cir.
1991) (citing Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 7–8).
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a good faith defense, an investor must show that he neither knew nor
should have known about the existence of the scheme when he
withdrew his profits. This objective test of good faith places a high,
and often inconsistent, hurtle before transferees which varies from
court to court.
But why present good faith as a defense at all? Courts have already
recognized that Ponzi schemes are simply a means of convincingly
rearranging money while the scammer skims off the top. In one sense,
letting investors keep their winnings from a Ponzi scheme is like
hosting a key party where everyone gets to keep the car they pull out
of the bowl. And yet, there are many supporters of the good faith
defense. Defenders assert that the good faith defense avoids punishing
blameless investors for their normal activity, encourages those who
discover a Ponzi scheme to report it quickly, and conforms to our gut
instincts about equity in bankruptcy.
These points are not entirely persuasive. Allowing those who win
out by withdrawing their investments early reduces the total size of
the estate, ensuring that other equally blameless creditors get an even
smaller pro-rata share than they normally would. And an informed
investor has no more of an interest in maintaining the existence of a
Ponzi scheme without good faith protection than with it. In either case
reporting the scheme will lead to a swift involuntary bankruptcy and a
small slice of the pie, with no incentive for future investment. Finally,
there is the argument about basic fairness, which I take a moment to
address.
Trustees can fashion hardship exemptions where an individual’s
return of a Ponzi scheme withdrawal would effectively precipitate
individual bankruptcies. Thus, the hardship exemption arguably
addresses concerns of fairness. For example, Irving Picard has
received ninety-five applications for hardship exemptions from
returning fictitious profits, and has granted some of them. 369 The
availability of a hardship exemption avoids unnecessary litigation and
promotes judicial efficiency. More importantly, the bankruptcy
system can accommodate an exemption for a devastated retiree with
little income as opposed to a wealthy individual fighting to keep a
drop in the bucket. 370 The Bankruptcy Code incorporates such social
369 Stewart Ain, Picard: ‘Hardship’ Cases Will Be Exempt, THE JEWISH WEEK, (March 8,
2011), http://www.thejewishweek.com/news/new_york/picard_hardship_cases_will_be_exempt.
370 For example, Nelson, supra note 278, focuses on the “value” prong of the affirmative
defense, and argues the narrow definition of value, which fails to consider opportunity costs or
time value of a creditor’s money, visits overly harsh results upon winning investors. That
argument, however, ignores both the brevity of the window in which clawback actions may be
brought, as well as the existence of available hardship exemptions.
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values in its pages—and it can do so in Ponzi scheme cases without
resorting to expensive and time consuming good faith litigation. The
Bankruptcy Code’s purpose is to promote a “fresh start” to debtors. 371
In Ponzi schemes, this purpose is frustrated since the product of fraud
cannot achieve a fresh start. To ameliorate this dead end, however,
the bankruptcy system can avoid the brick wall being thrust upon the
most financially vulnerable.
Perceptions about fairness and morality vary wildly from example
to example, even with only subtle differences. Take, for instance, the
famous case of the trolley problem. Barreling down the street at fifty
miles an hour is a trolley, which will eventually hit a group of ten
people. 372 Diverting the track will cause the train to swerve and
instead hit only one person. Over ninety percent of people surveyed
respond that they would pull the lever in that situation, killing one to
save ten, while virtually no one would be willing to push someone
into the path of the train to stop it, which would also kill one and save
ten. 373
Similarly, our moral intuitions about the good faith defense vary
based on whether we view a Ponzi scheme from the perspective of the
individual or the collective. The individual investor might be struck
by how deeply unfair it is for funds that he acquired in good faith to
be “clawed back” from him in the eleventh hour. Like a statute of
limitations or the ninety-day preference window, the good faith
defense gives that investor a period of time after which he can feel
confident in his financial security. But from the perspective of
investors as a whole, the reticent transferee begins to look like
someone who upon discovering the money he has obtained has been
stolen, refuses to return it to its rightful owner. The defense in that
case, that the unwitting thief felt so secure in his newfound wealth
that it is wrong to take it from him, would fall on deaf ears in most
courts. 374
Eliminating the good faith defense would produce a simple, brightline rule that would result in increased predictability and
administrative efficiency of the bankruptcy courts. The mish-mash of
371 See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (discussing the purpose of
providing a fresh start for the debtor).
372 See Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double
Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19, 23 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2002) (1978) (discussing this and other scenarios giving rise to moral dilemmas).
373 John Mikhail, Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future, TRENDS
IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES, Apr. 2007, at 143, 146.
374 See Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to Ownership of Treasure Trove as Between
Finder and Owner of Property on Which Found, 61 A.L.R.4th 1180 (1988) (outlining the
judicial tendency to not accept this defense).
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precedent has produced a definition of “good faith” that has strayed
far from the likely legislative meaning, or at least the ordinary usage
of the word. Narrowing the good faith defense to those who could not
have discovered the insolvent and fraudulent status of the scheme
without some extreme new level of due diligence, the courts have
ended up ignoring exactly those people most likely to possess
subjective good faith, the financially uninformed. 375
Small investors who might be bought off by sandwiches and
coffee are rarely going to understand how to do due diligence before
entering into a financial transaction. By contrast, large institutions
which are capable of thoroughly investigating an investment
beforehand are more likely to either avoid Ponzi schemes or take
advantage of them with an early investment and pull-out. In short, the
good faith defense fails mechanically as a way to get money to
creditors. It fails administratively as a way to make the courts run
smoothly. Most importantly, it fails morally by controverting our
vested expectation that the Bankruptcy Code should protect while
simultaneously promoting a “finders keepers” mentality for Ponzi
winners. The Supreme Court said it best in the original Ponzi case:
“Those who were successful in the race of diligence violated not only
[bankruptcy’s] spirit, but its letter, and secured an unlawful
preference.” 376 The same is true of the fraudulent transfer.
There is no shortage of Ponzi schemes. In the first six months of
2011 alone, forty-five possible Ponzi schemes have been reported. 377
A change to the Bankruptcy Code to measure and sensibly apply the
good faith defense is necessary. Some might argue that as it stands the
Code permits the trustee to recover “fictitious profits” and that no
more should be reached. 378 And Congress could, if it so desires, undo
that effect. Currently, fraudulent transfer law protects only those who
managed to make net profits in the Madoff scandal.379 If antiquated
fraudulent transfer provisions work against the policy, then Congress
must be heavy handed rather than fragmenting the changes in and out

375 See 1 GARY M. LAWRENCE, DUE DILIGENCE IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 2.01 (2010)
(outlining the judicial tendency to ignore the financially uninformed).
376 Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 13 (1924).
377 DILIGENTIA
GROUP,
2011
Ponzi
Schemes
By
the
Numbers,
http://www.diligentiagroup.com/due-diligence/2011-ponzi-schemes-by-the-numbers/
(last
visited Aug. 28, 2011).
378 Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941) (“But the theme of
the Bankruptcy Act is equality of distribution.”).
379 See Robert Schmidt & Jesse Westbrook, Madoff, Stanford Victims Unite, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(March
10,
2010
8:09
PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_12/b4171065645872.htm
(discussing
victims’ efforts to recover money lost in the Madoff Ponzi scheme).
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of bankruptcy. What might do justice in one case (Madoff) may not
necessarily do the same in another (Rothstein).380
Moral luck is a concept first mentioned by Bernard Williams and
expanded on by Thomas Nagel. 381 It considers a common bias, and
we dispense blame to those whose conduct runs afoul of our logic.
How then, do we assign moral blame or praise on those people who
believe they are making legitimate investments when they are, in fact,
prolonging a fraud on the public? Clawback suits, as found in the
Madoff and Rothstein cases, presume that no one is entitled to profit
from such a fraud while others suffer. 382 But could we really apply
this principle broadly? Imagine the savvy investor who, without
inside information, pulled his money out of Enron months before its
collapse so he could invest in more profitable ventures. Should he be
liable to other investors, who, lacking his intuition or expertise or
pure blind luck, saw their investments dwindle into nothing? Why
then, make such a rule for Ponzi schemes?
CONCLUSION
Will losers write the history of bankruptcy? Someone who
generates extraordinary rates of return is either a financial genius or a
bad-faith creditor, due to reasons beyond his knowledge or control.
Should we punish someone acting under subjective good faith after
the fact? Should we not treat differently the party that deliberately,
and in bad faith, invests in a Ponzi scheme for the specific purpose of
pulling out before it collapses? An investor might have been morally
in the right up to the very moment it discovered that the money it had
received was acquired fraudulently from others. At that point, the
investor has a new legal duty to rectify the situation to whatever
extent possible. Historical analogues include Nazi art and Native
American artifacts.
The Bankruptcy Code is a set of policy agreements in pursuit of
two seemingly simple goals. The code seeks to grant debtors a fresh
start and relief from life-long debts. At the same time, it attempts an
equitable distribution of assets among creditors. Each time a court
380 Carozza,

supra note 335.
generally B.A. O. Williams & T. Nagel, Moral Luck, 50 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN
SOC’Y 115 (1976) (describing the two philosophers’ thoughts on the topic).
382 Morality in bankruptcy is not new. The seven year limit enacted on bankruptcies was in
fact, directly suggested by the Old Testament. “At the end of every seven years you shall grant a
remission of debts. 2. And this is the manner of remission: every creditor shall release what he
has loaned to his neighbor; he shall not exact it of his neighbor and his brother, because the
LORD’s remission has been proclaimed.” Deuteronomy 15:1–2 (New American Standard
Bible).
381 See
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grants a winning investor the full extent of his winnings, every other
investor is pushed further away from the full return of his or her
principal. The good faith defense takes into account the innocence of
one investor while ignoring that factor for every other creditor left to
scrabble for their pro rata share regardless of culpability.
As courts have come to realize this, they have narrowed the good
faith exception ever further, limiting it to those whose best intelligent
efforts are stymied by persuasive and sophisticated schemers.
Maintaining this ever-shrinking exception fails to serve either fairness
or administrative efficiency, especially as courts have come to ever
less consistent conclusions about who should be protected. The good
faith defense remains a rare misstep within the Bankruptcy Code. By
elevating the interests of one sympathetic party above those of many
others, it creates wide disparities in a system that otherwise attempts
to create a strict hierarchy or priority to ensure equally situated
creditors are treated equally. As a relic whose time has come, the
good faith defense should be eliminated with all deliberate speed.

